RCT International Publication series No. 2

Safer Cities: A study of local governments' "good practice" in violence prevention

Praxis Paper

By Stine Finne Jakobsen

Praxis Paper: "Safer Cities: A study of local governments' "good practice" in violence prevention"
Report prepared by Stine Finne Jakobsen, Rehabilitation and Research Centre for Torture Victims.
ISSN: 2244-9957
ISBN: 978-87-90878-38-2
March 2012

Published by
Rehabilitation and Research Center for Torture Victims
Borgergade 13
DK-1014 Copenhagen K
Tel +45 33760600
E-mail: rct@rct.dk
Homepage: www.rct.org

Cover photo: Every Sunday more than 120 kilometres of Bogotá's main roads are closed for cars and temporarily turned into a network of bike paths called "Ciclovia". This 36-year success is now being copied in several large cities around the world. (Source: Alcaldia Mayor de Bogotá, www.bogota.gov.co)

This study was carried out to generate new knowledge to address the RCT policy challenge no. 3 of developing sustainable organisational strategies in the work against torture and organised violence in different political and socio-economic environments in developing countries.

This study will also be published in Spanish:
Ciudades más seguras: Un estudio de "buenas prácticas" de los gobiernos locales en la prevención de la violencia

Contents

ABSTRACT (English)

This study seeks to provide insights into "good practice" in violence prevention in highly violent urban contexts as inspiration for local governments, civil society groups and others interested in launching violence prevention interventions. With the concept of human security as the analytical frame, the study explores a range of bottom-up and top-down violence prevention strategies launched in Colombia's capital Bogotá under the leadership of the local government. Since the mid-1990s a comprehensive multi-sectoral violence prevention policy has been implemented here, which is exemplary in its human rights based approach to violence prevention and development. In the same period the city's violence levels have decreased dramatically, with homicide rates falling from above 80 hhti in 1992 to around 20 hhti in 2006-2011. Based on a case study of Bogotá and a review of publications on violence prevention initiatives in Colombia a series of lessons learned and key findings are presented on how to implement efficient violence prevention programs within a human security frame.

RESUMEN (Español)

Este estudio pretende arrojar luz sobre las "buenas prácticas" en la prevención de la violencia en contextos urbanos altamente violentos. El objetivo primordial del texto es servir como fuente de inspiración para los gobiernos locales, los grupos de la sociedad civil y otros interesados en el lanzamiento de intervenciones de prevención de la violencia. Con el concepto de seguridad humana como el marco analítico, el estudio explora una gama de estrategias de prevención de la violencia puestas en marcha en Bogotá Colombia, bajo el liderazgo del gobierno local. Desde mediados de 1990 una amplia política multisectorial de prevención de la violencia se ha llevado a cabo en la ciudad, siendo ejemplar en el enfoque sobre derechos humanos basado en la prevención de la violencia y el desarrollo. En el mismo período los niveles de violencia en Bogota se han reducido de manera espectacular, con tasas de homicidios que caen por encima del 80 hhti en 1992 a alrededor del 20 hhti el período 2006-2011. Basado en un estudio de caso de Bogotá y una revisión de las publicaciones sobre las iniciativas de prevención de la violencia en Colombia, el texto presenta una serie de lecciones aprendidas y las principales conclusiones se presentan en la forma de aplicar programas eficientes de prevención de la violencia dentro de un marco de seguridad humana.

Executive Summary

Latin America is among the regions that suffer from the highest violence levels in the world, and the recent overall tendency is a further rise. The type of violence that Latin American and many other countries face is *interlinked*, i.e. the lines between different expressions of violence are blurred. For example, seemingly arbitrary or criminal violence may serve political purposes; violence experienced in the home may be linked to violence in the streets or political conflicts; high homicide rates may be strongly associated with fragile institutions, which again may enhance the risk of state violence. High levels of violence are detrimental for development processes; they erode social capital and divert state funds towards militarization and away from social investment. Preventing violence, combating crime and fomenting human security are therefore important imperatives for fostering positive developments in Latin America and other violence-ridden regions.

The present report is aimed at a broad audience of civil society organizations and policymakers in the Latin American region and other areas with high levels of urban violence who are engaged in developing efficient approaches to violence prevention. Guided by the concept of human security, the objective of this research is to identify effective violence prevention initiatives that *reduce* violence and *strengthen* state institutions to provide better security for citizens and foster positive developments. The study has been launched and conducted with two objectives:

1. To provide insights into "good practice" in urban contexts with high levels of violence, in particular the prevention initiatives launched by city mayors and local authorities; and
2. To provide inspiration and orientation to civil society groups and others who are engaged in fomenting effective violence prevention interventions.

For the local government's leading role and its important achievements in violence prevention, Colombia's capital Bogotá has been selected as a case for in-depth study. In spite of Colombia's extensive illegal drug production and record of severe human rights violations, since the mid-1990s in several Colombian urban areas ambitious violence prevention interventions have been launched and driven by local governments with a political will to improve their citizens' security. In particular Bogotá is an interesting case for in-depth study because it shows that despite very difficult circumstances it *is* possible to change an extremely violent city into a much safer place for its citizens. This study reviews some of these experiences and interventions

in relation to their ability to prevent violence efficiently while also strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide better security and social development.

Key findings and recommendations

The study is based on a review of publications on violence prevention initiatives in Colombia and a two-week field study undertaken in Bogotá comprising project visits and interviews with key actors and stakeholders. The following key findings and recommendations are drawn from the reviewed successful violence prevention programs:

- Violence is caused by a complex interaction between multiple risk factors and violence prevention thus requires comprehensive interventions that include both control measures and preventive strategies across a wide range of sectors like education, health, social protection and urban development;
- Interventions should be based on accurate data and knowledge about specific problems, driving forces, at-risk groups and risky behavior in the area, as well as existing knowledge and interventions already tested in other contexts. This enables more accurate targeting of interventions, as well as better focused evaluation and measurement of their impact;
- To optimize resources, comprehensive violence prevention initiatives need to be implemented in close collaboration with a variety of institutions and actors from the public to the private, including the academic milieu, NGOs and churches;
- Local governments with strong leadership have proven to be important in coordinating comprehensive violence prevention interventions. Moreover, local governments may be more responsive to local needs than national or provincial authorities, and able to work in a more participatory fashion, thus ensuring that interventions are better rooted in the context;
- Strengthening the ability of state institutions to guarantee people's safety enhances citizens' confidence in them. It is particularly important that reforms of the security forces seek to demilitarize them and increase their transparency and accountability to civil authorities and the population; and
- A first step towards empowering citizens to be active participants in violence prevention initiatives is to reduce their indifference to violence, both domestic and political. Secondly, it is important to engage citizens in the violence prevention agenda so that they hold institutions such as the police accountable for their actions and omissions, and pressure politicians to keep the issue on the agenda.

The reviewed violence prevention interventions and policies in Bogotá took place in a setting characterized by *political will* across shifting mayors and administrations to continue with existing projects, efforts and interventions, which allowed for long-term impacts to materialize. Simultaneously, continuous support by the public, local politicians and administrators for the violence prevention interventions and measures was secured by building confidence that *change is possible.*

Chapter 1: Violence and Violence Prevention in Latin America

During the last three decades homicide rates have shown a gradual decline in most regions of the world except Latin America and the Caribbean (and possibly also southern Africa) where there is a striking upward trend from about 12.6 per 100,000 in the early 1990s to almost 20 per 100,000 in recent years (World Bank 2011c: 51).[1] Latin America is thus among the regions that suffer from the highest violence levels in the world, and the overall tendency is a further rise. The established causes and correlates of conflict and elevated violence levels include internal factors such as inequality and legacies of armed conflict, and external ones like international criminal networks, price shocks and climate change (World Bank 2011c: 7. See also Geneva Declaration 2011: 7-9). A country's ability to respond to such internal and external stress factors depends on the strength or weakness of its institutional legitimacy and governance, in other words there is a "relationship between higher levels of armed violence and fragile institutional capacities" (Geneva Declaration 2011: 9). Moreover, for countries with fragile institutions and widespread violence there is a risk that state security forces may commit acts of violence with impunity, including torture, unlawful arrests, undocumented abductions, extra-juridical killings and other human rights violations (Ibid.). Conversely, countries where more criminal cases are solved by the criminal justice system - in other words where there is less impunity - may enjoy a higher respect for the rule of law.

A first important step to prevent the type of violence that Latin American and many other countries face is to recognize its nature as *interlinked*, hence it does not make sense treat political, domestic or collective violence as separate. Rather, the reality is that the lines between different expressions of violence are blurred, for example seemingly arbitrary or criminal violence may serve political purposes (Geneva Declaration 2011: 2), violence experienced in the home may be linked to violence in the streets or in political conflicts (World Bank 2011a: xiv), and high homicide rates may be strongly associated with fragile institutions that again may enhance the risk of state violence (Geneva Declaration 2011: 9). Latin American countries are affected by violence to different degrees and in different regions. In Colombia and Mexico, peripheral and rural regions are badly hit by violence, while in Brazil, Venezuela and Central America cities and rapidly growing urban areas are most affected. Urban areas of rapid growth require particular attention because underemployment, structural inequalities, gangs and organized crime networks, easy access to

[1] For details on regional trends in homicide, see the background paper on homicides prepared for The World Development report by Fearon 2010.

firearms and illicit drugs increase the society's vulnerability to destabilizing levels of violence (World Bank 2011a: xii, 2011c: 7).

High levels of violence are detrimental to development processes, erode social capital, and divert state funds towards militarization and away from social investments. For example, widespread violence has cost Honduras and El Salvador an estimated 9-10% of their GNP (World Bank 2011b: 7).[2] Preventing violence, combating crime and fomenting human security are therefore important imperatives for fostering positive developments in Latin America and other violence-ridden regions. International organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank[3], the World Bank[4] and many UN bodies have supported violence prevention initiatives with donations, loans and technical support. Existing evidence suggests that the most effective violence prevention approaches include *both* control and prevention strategies (World Bank 2011a: 5), but there is a worldwide tendency for national governments to prioritize repressive measures in response to widespread violence – such as strengthening the police force and improving the justice system - over more preventive types of intervention (World Bank 2011c: 1-7). The effects on crime and violence of repressive and militarized responses to security challenges have been widely questioned and studies show that they have problematic side-effects for social cohesion and protection of fundamental rights (Partners for Peacebuilding 2011; Solis 2007; Thale 2006). A security strategy focused primarily on improving police and military capacity to combat organized crime may yield a few short-term victories, but there is an inherent risk of losing the long-term battle for security because institutional legitimacy is undermined (Partners for Peacebuilding 2011).

"Without an essential foundation of the Rule of Law, strong and fair judicial and political institutions, and accountability systems to protect the principles of democracy and human rights ... [a] militarized approach to security is only increasing corruption and impunity, repressing basic rights and freedoms, and making the security situation worse." (Ibid)

[2] The Inter-American Development Bank has carried out research to quantify the economic cost of violence, e.g. direct costs (health losses, material losses, expenses to security measures) and the indirect costs (non-monetary effects on victims, reduced investments, productivity, labor and consumption) (Buvinic et al. 2005: 5-6).

[3] The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) adopted citizens' security as a new lending line in its portfolio in the late 1990s. This was justified on the basis of research documenting the economic costs of violence (Buvinic et al. 2005).

[4] The World Bank has published various studies on violence and supported national violence prevention initiatives in a range of countries (see e.g. World Bank 2011a, World Bank 2011b) .

A militarized and repressive approach to violence prevention may at worst lead to corrupt security forces committing state violence such as acts of torture, forced disappearances or extralegal executions. This risk is most acute in countries experiencing widespread violence which also have weak or illegitimate state institutions characterized by state imperfection and bad governance. Here citizens typically have limited confidence in state institutions, which effectively are unable to protect and guarantee their safety. Not all governments in Latin America apply a repressive approach, however. There are examples of local and national governments that have applied more preventive, public health-inspired and multi-sectoral approaches, or approaches combining prevention and repression, which *also* have had positive effects on state institutions and appear to have facilitated less militarized and more transparent security forces. These examples are the subject of this study.

Objectives of the research

The study aims to identify effective violence prevention initiatives that *reduce* violence and *strengthen* state institutions to provide better security for citizens and foster positive developments. Two well-known examples of effective multi-sectoral violence prevention programs conducted at the local level are Bogotá's citizen's security program and Cali's DESEPAZ from Colombia (World Bank 2011a: 91-108).[5] The interventions shared the following characteristics:

- They were initiated and largely led by city mayors and local governments, but involved a range of actors in the actual implementation;
- They were preventive rather than repressive, but with an element of repressive interventions such as improved sanction of lawbreakers, incarceration of dangerous elements and rehabilitation of delinquents. They also paid attention to victims of crime and violence, an important aspect of the preventive model;
- They were public health-based, and used baseline data and reliable statistics as central tools to plan interventions and evaluate progress, e.g. mappings of crime patterns to identify and address problematic areas and focused interventions; and social indicators to identify at-risk groups, areas and communities;

[5] Two other examples of effective violence prevention are from Brazil, namely Diadem in the state of São Paulo and Fica Vivo en Belo Horizonte (World Bank 2011a: 91-108).

- They were multi-sectoral and integral, i.e. involving a range of sectors from health to education to justice, and the interventions ranged from information campaigns in schools to home visits with at-risk families to projects with at-risk youth.

This study seeks to extract lessons learned from some of these successful violence prevention experiences in order to provide inspiration for others who work in this field. For the important achievements in violence prevention and the local government's leading role Bogotá, Colombia has been selected as a case for in-depth study.

Structure of the report

This introductory chapter is followed by Chapter 2 *Methods and key concepts*, which is a presentation of the study's analytical framework. Chapter 3 is a *Review of Violence Prevention Literature* presenting the dominating themes. Chapter 4 *Successful Violence Prevention Experiences in Colombia* introduces the Colombian national context and the capital city Bogotá's experiences in violence prevention based on examples from the field study. Chapter 5 is a discussion of central elements in Bogotá's violence prevention approach, and finally Chapter 6 draws general conclusions and lessons learned from the literature review and the in-depth study.

Chapter 2: Methods and key concepts

Analytical framework

The study applies the concept of **human security** as a framework for exploring and discussing the reviewed interventions in relation to their ability to prevent violence efficiently while also strengthening legitimate institutions and governance, and providing security and social development for the citizen (see also the 2011 Human Development Report, World Bank 2011c: 2). Violence prevention based on the human security concept places the individual rather than the state as the security referent, thus guaranteeing that the state's security concerns do not dominate the agenda. It recognizes that states often threaten rather than protect their own citizens,[6] and it places personal protection, safety in the localities, political security and security against oppression, organized violence and other pervasive threats at the center.

The human security concept thus brings two strategies into play: empowerment and protection, and casts citizens and institutions as two central groups of actors in violence prevention. On the one hand, active community engagement and citizens' participation is key to ensuring that interventions are efficient and do not compromise other basic rights. Citizens' participation has proven to be important for keeping violence prevention on the political agenda, thus generating and fostering the political will to combine various violence prevention efforts and, not least, ensuring continuity across changing administrations and city mayors. In sum, violence prevention interventions with a human security foundation need to be participatory through a strategic "bottom-up empowerment" of the population and inclusion of local governance.[7] This may ensure that local policies and governance mechanisms are more in tune with actual local needs. On the other hand, violence prevention interventions based on human security need to be protection-driven, that is, driven by a strategic "top-down" development of the state institutions responsible for security and prevention through e.g. new norms, reforms and training. The objective is to foster state institutions so that they are able to protect citizens from danger, continuously improving the fulfillment of human rights standards, and to foster societies that are free from fear of violence, particularly state violence. Thus ideally, human security based violence prevention not only

[6] The UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report is considered a milestone in the human security debate, and since then the concept *human security* has been widely used by donors and debated in global policy discussions. Critiques of the concept argue that it lacks a clear common definition, it does not help to prioritize among needs and that 'relations' among interventions are unclear, e.g. interventions in one area may have repercussion for other areas (see e.g. Tadjbakhsh 2005).

[7] Kjaerulf and Barahona (2010) provides a framework for prevention of violence that combines rights-based top-down and bottom-up action.

protects, but also empowers people and societies as a means of enhancing security – and people contribute by identifying and implementing solutions to insecurity.

With this framework, the study aims to explore recent successful and effective violence prevention policies and in particular their ability to prevent violence, enhance citizens' security and strengthen institutions towards more democratic and transparent functioning.

Methods

The study's first phase was a literature search through peer-reviewed research, policy studies, manuals and publications from national and international organizations on violence prevention initiatives in Colombia. Focus was on identifying local government approaches at the municipal level that offered a promising avenue for effectively reducing violence. With the search terms[8]: "Colombia" , "prevention" or "prevención" and "violence" or "violencia", RCT's Documentation Centre searched the following databases: RCT Documentation Centre Database, Current Contents, IBSS, Virtual Health Library, Medline, and the following publishers: Redalyc, Sage, Elsevier, Taylor & Francis, Oxford University Press, Wiley and Cambridge University Press. Documents written in both English and Spanish were retrieved. The documents were filtered for those with a violence prevention angle and the outcome was 65 references. Based on a reading of the summaries, the selection was categorized under the following thematic headings: (A) Police/ security sector/ criminal justice; (B) Schools/Youth/At-risk populations; (C) Community/social movements; (D) Family; (E) Judicial sector/rule of law; (F) Local Governance; and(G) Other.

The retrieved references were read, and from their reference lists another 30 relevant primarily policy documents were identified (all documents are listed under References). From Colombia the best described violence prevention initiatives were the ones conducted in the three largest cities: Bogotá, Medellín and Cali. These cities have been pioneers in developing public health inspired violence prevention models, though with varying results. The most consistent results in violence prevention have been achieved in the capital city Bogotá and this is why it was chosen as the case study for this paper.

The project's second phase was a two-week field study undertaken in Bogotá, Colombia, during October 2011. Different projects and organizations central in the local governments' violence prevention policy were visited and interviews conducted with key actors and stakeholders. The aim was to gather

[8] Other possible terms could have been "crime" and "security".

detailed information about experiences and lessons learned. Based on the literature review and the field data the following project report has been written. The report is directed to practitioners within the field of violence prevention who may be able to use it as a source of inspiration for launching preventive interventions with a human security framework in their respective contexts.

Key terms and concepts

The key term violence is a contested concept with a range of definitions. A range of typologies exist in the literature to categorize violence e.g. according to levels of violence, responsible actor or motive. One example is the violence typologies developed by WHO, which classify violence as interpersonal and collective (or organized) where the former covers family and community violence, and the latter social, political and economic violence.[9] However, recently more emphasis has been placed on the *interlinked* nature of violence and in consequence treating political, domestic or collective violence as separate categories does not make sense. As mentioned above, the lines between different expressions of violence are blurred – for example seemingly arbitrary or criminal violence may serve political purposes (Geneva Declaration 2011: 2), violence experienced in the home may be linked to violence in the streets or in political conflicts (World Bank 2011a: xiv), and high homicide rates may be strongly associated with fragile institutions that again may enhance the risk of state violence (Geneva Declaration 2011: 9).

The concept local governance is used to circumscribe the sphere of local government institutions and their relations to citizens, for example in participatory processes, service provision and protection of basic human rights.[10] In a decentralized political system, local government institutions, e.g. elected politicians and public employees in charge of municipal administrations and local level state institutions – from mayors to police officers to teachers and bureaucrats - are the most important state representatives and initiators of reforms at the municipal level. The role of local government is given primary attention in this study due to its potential to facilitate processes of change and to be a driving force in reforms and as implementer of violence prevention initiatives.

The examples of intervention analysed in this study all apply a public health approach to violence prevention. Based on epidemiological research and intervention methods, public health approaches to violence prevention follow four sequential steps (Kjaerulf and Barahona 2010: 387):

[9] For a discussion of these typologies see Kjaerulf and Barahona 2010. See also the WHO publications: WHO (1996) Violence: A public health priority. Geneva: WHO.; Krug, EG, Dahlbert, L; Mercy, J. Zwi, A, and Lozano, R (2002) World Health Report on Violence. Geneva: WHO.

[10] For an analysis of intervention models employed to improve local governance, see Friis-Hansen and Kyed (2009).

(1) defining the violence problem through systematic data collection, (2) exploring causes by identifying risks and protective factors and researching who it affects; (3) designing, testing, and evaluating preventive interventions to establish what works for whom; and (4) ensuring widespread adoption of the most effective and promising interventions and assessing their impact and cost-effectiveness. Thus public health approaches are characterized by being inter-sectoral and by using scientific methods to ensure evidence-based programming. Some risk factors and at-risk groups are already known, but it is key to conduct specific data collection in each context (ibid.).

A recent example of how the public health approaches' emphasis on epidemiological methods, surveillance systems and surveys can be combined with a human security framework is found in Medellín's local governments' public violence prevention policy (Duque 2011). Here the argument for including a human security framework is that human security is considered a public good that enables the guarantee of human rights and freedoms, governance and human development. By combining an epidemiological public health approach with the more social science based human security approach, the public policies strengthen the emphasis on empowerment and dialogue with the actors, e.g. through mappings and discussions of problems and challenges at stakeholder meetings (Ibid.).

Box 1 - Ways to measure violence

Non-fatal crimes, torture and intrafamily violence are often significantly under-reported and thus almost impossible to measure accurately and compare across countries, and the same applies for drugs - and arms trafficking and organized crime (Cohen and Rubio 2007). **Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants** (hhti) is generally considered the most accurate indicator for an overall comparison of crime and violence across countries, but different sources may still report different and even contradictory rates due to differences in definitions, reporting rates, and survey methodologies (Cohen and Rubio 2007). A change in the hhti is therefore most often a key measure to establish whether a violence prevention intervention is successful or not.

Victimization surveys asking people whether they or their family have been a victim of any crime or violence during the past 6 or 12 months is another measure applied to assess crime and violence levels. Such surveys may reveal large variations in crime and violence rates both in time and space, e.g. differences between departments in a country or barrios in a city or among inhabitants in a municipality. Another widely used measure is the **perception survey,** which maps citizens' perceptions of aspects of crime and violence, for example of the police. Such surveys, conducted regularly in Bogotá, have shown that despite a significant drop in the city's crime and violence rates, people's *perceptions* of insecurity have remained unaltered. A qualitative study in nine poor communities in Colombia found that the most widely experienced type of violence was economic (e.g. drugs, insecurity, robberies, gangs and prostitution), followed by social violence (e.g. intrafamily, fights, alcoholism, rape, others) and lastly political (e.g. selective killings, blackmail, threats, rebel activities and warfare) (Moser and McIlwaine 2000: 24-25).

Chapter 3: Review of Violence Prevention Literature

Introduction

The study's review of peer-reviewed research, policy studies, manuals and publications from national and international organizations on violence prevention initiatives in Colombia revealed that the experiences from the three largest cities of Cali, Medellín and Bogotá are well described and their impacts quite extensively analysed.[11] There is a large national literature of reports, evaluations and articles exploring the violence prevention interventions and their effects. Moreover, the Colombian experiences are widely cited in international publications on violence prevention – for example from the World Bank (2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2003) and the Inter-American Development Bank (2003; Buvinic et al. 2005) – as examples of successful violence prevention interventions. Other often-mentioned examples of effective violence prevention interventions stem from Brazil (Briseno-Leon et al. 2008: 754; Buvinic 2008; World Bank 2011a), Chile (World Bank 2011c) and Uruguay (Alda et al. 2006). Drawing to a large extent on the (few) examples of effective violence prevention interventions an orthodoxy has emerged on how such programs and policies are best conducted. The section below discusses best practice themes and recommendations presented in the policy literature under four main headings, namely: (a) Multi-sectoral approaches; (b) Evidence-based interventions; (c) Research and data-collection; and (d) Balanced short- and long-term impact interventions.

Multi-sectoral Approaches

Across the reviewed literature a consensus exists that the most efficient violence prevention initiatives adopt **integral or multi-sectoral approaches** which both strengthen institutions within the police, justice and punitive systems and focus broadly on prevention across a range of sectors, including urban development, education, health, social protection, labor markets and community involvement in the development of cities (WB 2011a: 5). While they may share several components, this approach is often associated with 'zero tolerance' or 'tough hand' policies that prioritize repressive measures rather than preventive ones to impact serious crime and violence levels and which have been implemented in many countries across the world. One study by Beckett and Godoy (2010) compares the efforts launched to enhance security and civility in New York and Bogotá during the 1990s – a period in which both cities became markedly safer. They find some similarities in the conceptualization and operationalization of these ideals in the two cities as well as important differences. In New York the applied policies and programs followed a 'zero tolerance' approach to disorder and crime, whereas the approach applied in Bogotá was

[11] For a presentation of the existing Colombian literature in relation to violent behaviour from 1990-2002 see Gutiérrez et al. 2004.

much broader and included measures to protect rights, enhance social services, and improve the use of public areas (Ibid.: 278). The authors argue that: "The Bogotá example shows that it is possible to take crime and civility seriously without criminalizing minor offences and by coupling security measures with broader initiatives to strengthen democratic inclusion" (Ibid.: 277), and thus conclude that 'zero tolerance' is not the only viable way to implement effective anti-crime policies.

Successful multi-sectoral violence prevention interventions are characterized by city officials and mayors exerting strong leadership. Generally, local governments are close to the citizens, aware of local problems, and in charge of basic service provision such as infrastructure, urban development, health, education and welfare – all central for violence prevention (World Bank 2003: 14-15). Because local governments have a broad portfolio of responsibilities and competences they may be able to coordinate multi-sectoral violence prevention projects that involve both security and social sector agencies as well as non-governmental actors (Buvinic et al. 2005: 22). However, it is a limitation that local governments cannot run projects at the national level and some may lack institutional and technical capacity to lead and execute comprehensive projects. For national level interventions, the Ministry of Interior may be the lead agency because of its competences in areas such as police, surveillance systems and remedial interventions, but it has often less competence within social preventive work (Buvinic et al. 2005: 22).

Most of the violence prevention interventions considered successful in the reviewed literature stem from larger cities in middle-income countries (MIC) where the local governments and public institutions have been capable of launching, coordinating and implementing multi-sectoral violence prevention interventions.[12] These are cities with businesses, industries and middle-class citizens providing tax revenue for a quite well functioning public service in health, education, infrastructure and public transportation. Another example of multi-sectoral violence prevention efforts from outside Latin America is South Africa, where very high violence curves have been reversed during the 00s in several large cities (World Bank 2011c).[13] South Africa is also a middle-income country - the most developed and industrialized on the African continent – and its urban areas have rather well functioning local governance structures, institutions and public service provision.[14] Based on the characteristics of these examples it is relevant to ask whether

[12] The World Bank defines lower MIC as GNP 1,000 USD-3,975, and higher MIC 3,976-12,275. Source: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications

[13] South African homicide rates can be found here: http://www.iss.co.za/CJM/statgraphs/murder1.htm

[14] The South African government has developed a manual for community based crime prevention, which the WB has translated into Spanish and adapted to Latin America with local examples, see WB 2003.

multi-sectoral, locally driven approaches to violence prevention – involving a wide range of actors and working across sectors – are at all feasible to implement in low-income countries with weaker institutions, fewer resources and precarious local governance capacity.

Case studies comparing failures and successes can perhaps provide some new insights on how to handle this challenge. Exploring violence prevention experiences in Lagos or Nairobi, for example, which are cities with very challenging socio-economic conditions and poor local governance records, could yield important insights. Some guidelines and recommendations from international organizations acknowledge that replicating the multi-sectoral and integral approaches to violence prevention may not be possible in all areas (IDB 2003; IDB n.d; World Bank 2011a, 2003). One example is the IDB, which acknowledges the complexity of effective multi-sectoral programs, but concludes that future programs could profit from being more focused on a limited number of risk factors or activities (IDB 2003: 23). But what sectors or intervention types from the multi-sectoral approach should then be prioritized? It is hard to give a clear and well founded answer because while the positive overall impact of the integral approaches' entire package of interventions and reforms is quite well documented the evidence of each individual intervention or projects' impact is scarce.

Evidence-based interventions

It is a part of the orthodoxy on "best practice" that the launched violence prevention interventions should be based on evidence of their efficiency. However, in the Latin American literature on violence prevention, research on specific types of interventions and their effects is scarce. Existing evidence of interventions' efficiency draws predominantly on research conducted on interventions in high-income countries such as the US and the UK (for a comprehensive review see Aos et al. 2004, 2006; Sherman et al. 1997, 1998). The violence prevention models and interventions developed and tested here have provided inspiration for many of the initiatives launched in Latin America. But again it is a question whether programs developed in high-income countries can meaningfully be copied and implemented in middle- and low-income countries with different socio-economic conditions and institutional contexts (Cohen and Rubio 2007: 20).

Among the most researched and best documented types of violence prevention are early interventions targeting at-risk mothers and children under age 5 (Cohen and Rubio 2007: 21; NIH 2004. For a review see Henao 2005). In Medellín, Colombia, a large-scale violence prevention intervention targeting at-risk children in public schools and kinder-gardens, their parents and professional caregivers has produced several positive impacts in terms of improved pro-social behavior and reduction in aggression (Duque et al. 2007). However, the intervention faced a range of constraints, including low compliance with the program, limited

interest from school teachers, and family members staying away from programmed family sessions (Ibid.: 27) [15;16].

A review by Cohen and Rubio (2007) identifies three areas of intervention that have yielded positive results in the US. The first specific area of intervention are comprehensive programs dealing with at-risk youth and gang violence in coordinated inter-agency efforts involving activities across police, courts, schools, social service agencies, and community groups, which have proven to significantly reduce gang violence and membership (Cohen and Rubio 2007: 22-26). Secondly, comprehensive prison treatment and reintegration programs including drug treatment, educational and vocational programs, and cognitive behavioral therapy is another area of intervention that has proved to have good results (Ibid.: 25). Thirdly, domestic violence prevention and control is also an area of violence prevention with a proven positive impact (Ibid.: 27 quoting Sherman et al. 1997).

Research and data collection

The literature emphasizes research and data collection as a central element in best practice interventions because it enables precise targeting and accurate assessments of the intervention's effects and impacts. Data collection is central for epidemiological and public health based preventive approaches as a tool to target interventions and policies towards the most problematic areas or groups (WB 2011c: 6). Specialized violence observatories have been established nationally and/or locally in many countries to permanently monitor developments in crime and violence.[17] The tasks performed by such observatories include investigations and mapping of violence and crime, identification of typologies, problem areas, risk behavior and risk profiles, as well as on how many criminals are captured and penalized. One of the challenges in this is that conducting such highly specialized research and data collection requires resources and skills which may not be readily available in all settings – so this is an area where international actors can provide crucial support. Moreover, experiences from the US have shown that a strong political focus on numbers and certain types of crime and violence may produce perverse side-effects, for example inducing the local police to over-report certain actions (e.g. how many criminals caught) and under-report others (e.g. the number of acts of crime in their area).

[15] See also Agudelo 2005 for a description of the internal dynamics in some of the participating families;

[16] Training manual for caregivers working with small children see Slaby et al. and training manual for family counselors see Gutiérrez 2003.

[17] For an analysis of 20 countries' armed violence monitoring systems see Gilgen and Tracy 2011.

Balancing short-term and long-term impact interventions

In the literature it is recommended as "best practice" to balance long- and short-term impact interventions in order to generate immediate public and institutional support for violence prevention policies and priorities and thereby "earn" time for the long-term impact interventions to function. Short-term impact interventions with immediate effects and relatively low costs often seek to reduce immediate triggers of violent behavior, e.g. bans on alcohol sales and on carrying firearms reinforced by information campaigns and enforcement measures. Long-term impact interventions include improvements in education, changes in culture and improved social equality – which have proven more cost efficient than strict violence *control* – but only show results after several years (Buvinic et al. 2005: 7). By including both in the violence prevention interventions, the achievement of immediate results may ensure continued support for the violence prevention policies, and thus allow for the more long-term effects to materialize (Melo 2009). It is clear from this that *time* is an important factor for long-term impacts to show results and it is widely recognized in the literature that there are no quick fixes to effective violence prevention. Multi-sectoral or integral approaches require a long and continuous effort in order to yield positive results.

Precisely how crucial *continuity* is for obtaining positive results from multi-sectoral violence prevention is exemplified in the Colombian literature describing municipal level experiences in Cali, Medellín and Bogotá. During the 1980s all three cities experienced a steep rise in crime and violence and in the early 1990s local politicians in Cali were pioneers in launching concerted violence reduction and prevention interventions based on a public health approach (for more details see Guerrero 2003). Soon the local governments in Medellin and Bogotá - with some variation over time and across the cities - launched similar complex multi-sectoral violence prevention approaches (Ibid.: 9). However, if homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants (hhti) are taken as indicator for changes in violence levels great differences among the cities appear.

During the 1990s the violence prevention pioneer Cali achieved a reduction from above 120 to around 80 hhti, although this is still high by regional standards (see Table 1 below). The capital city Bogotá homicide rates surpassed the national average in 1993 with 81 hhti and since then the city has experienced a steady decline: between 1995 and 1997 from 70 to 47 hhti (Cala Buendia 2010), and in 2006 further down to 18 hhti – an impressive 78% decline (Moncada 2009: 434). After a small increase the city's hhti has largely stabilized in recent years at around 20 hhti.

Table 1: Homicide rates Bogotá and Cali, 1991-2004



Source: Concha-Eastman 2005: 17

However, establishing a causal relation between the implemented multi-sectoral violence prevention interventions and the decline in the two cities' hhti is difficult. Table 1 shows that Bogotá's decline in fact began prior to Cali's in spite of Cali being the pioneer in launching concerted violence prevention interventions. Moreover, Bogotá's decline actually began *before* the city's own local government began launching comprehensive multi-sectoral interventions in 1995. Establishing and proving clear causal relations between implemented violence prevention policies and rising or falling homicide rates is very challenging (for a critique of such causal links see Harcourt and Ludwig (2006))[18]. Observers and analysts comparing Cali and Bogotá explain the difference in the hhti reduction rate as caused by lack of political continuity in Cali, where changing city administrations have discontinued launched violence prevention initiatives (Concha-Eastman 2005; Guerrero 2003). Conversely, it is argued that Bogotá's impressive results in bringing down violence levels can be explained by successive administrations and city mayors' dedication to continue the concerted multi-sectoral prevention efforts (Ibid.). Let us now take a closer look at Colombia and in particular the case of Bogotá.

[18] Harcourt and Ludwig (2006) argue in an article critical of the widely used "zero tolerance" and "broken window policing" across US cities that the attribution of the recorded violence reduction in New York during the 1990s to these violence prevention policies is in fact a statistical mean reversion (Ibid.: 276) and not a causal relation. The article argues that "jurisdictions with the greatest increases in crime during the 1980s tend to experience the largest subsequent declines as well. We call this Newton's Law of Crime: what goes up must come down (and what goes up the most tends to come down the most)" (Ibid.).

Chapter 4: Successful Violence Prevention Experiences in Colombia

With the only ongoing armed conflict in Latin America, extensive illegal drug production and trafficking and a record of severe human rights violations, it may seem paradoxical to present Colombia as an example of successful violence prevention experiences. However, or perhaps in spite of the above, official statistics on crime and violence rates show that since the mid-1990s the major urban areas in particular have experienced improved security and important violence reduction. In this period several city mayors and local governments have launched ambitious violence prevention interventions driven by a political will to improve the citizens' security. These interventions and the lessons that can be drawn are what this chapter explores.

The chapter falls in two parts. The first introduces the national political context and the overall security problems in Colombia. The second part looks more closely at multi-sectoral violence prevention initiatives initiated by the local government in Bogotá.

Part 1 - Background and national setting

Politics and economy

In the 1980s the central government in Colombia launched a fiscal, administrative and political decentralization process, which gave more executive power to the municipal level of government. New resources and responsibilities fell onto the municipalities, like the development of local development plans. In 1991 a new and quite modern constitution gave Colombia a solid legal foundation on which to build an inclusive democracy. Among many other things it guarantees the citizens' property rights, access to a dignified dwelling, freedom of assembly and the right to recreation, sports and a healthy environment – at least on paper. Paradoxically, these quite positive policy developments have unfolded in a context of increasing illegal drug trade and ongoing armed conflict.

Violence, armed conflict and drug trade

The 1980s was also the period when Colombia's national homicide rate exploded, surpassing 80 hhti between 1985 and 1991 (Bonilla 2009: 12. For a discussion of this rise see Gaviria 2000). It dropped steadily through the 90s to around 60 hhti in 1997, rose again to above 75 hhti in 2002, and began a significant decline in 2003 (Ibid.). Several studies have tested a range of factors for their relation to the violence levels.

Leonardo Bonilla (2009) tests a possible relation between demographic changes and violence levels, i.e. whether a major proportion of youth in the population has led to higher homicide rates, and concludes that demographic changes cannot explain the recent changes in homicide rates (Ibid.: 41). Poverty is another variable that is ruled out because Colombian municipalities with a minor proportion of poor people in fact experience more violence (Ibid.: 42). One factor that was clearly related to the steep increase in the 1980s was the rapid increase in illegal drug production and trafficking that the country went though. The Colombian government's attempts to combat the powerful cartels unleashed a wave of terrorist attacks in the capital Bogotá and the second largest city Medellín.

Also profiting from the lucrative drug business, the leftwing rebel or guerrilla groups grew in strength and gained control over large areas of the country throughout the 1980s and 90s. The largest guerrilla group, FARC, reached its height in 2001 with an army of 17.000 fighters (Pécaut 2008: 106).[19] Conversely, the government's control shrank; rural police stations and military posts were constantly under guerrilla attack and many shut down because it was too dangerous to be there (Llorente 2004: 68). When the police and military withdrew to the safer urban areas, the rural civilians were left to the mercy of the guerrillas. Dissatisfied with the state institutions' inability to challenge the guerrillas' growing influence, private paramilitary militias took up the challenge to regain control over these areas. This led to violent clashes between guerrillas and paramilitaries, with the civilian population caught in the middle suffering gross human rights violations, including massacres, sexual violence, forced disappearances and massive population displacements. Fighting a common enemy, a tacit collaborative relationship developed between the paramilitaries and the Colombian armed forces (Avilés 2001, 2006; Dudley 2004; Hunt 2009; Gallego 1990). Evidence exists of paramilitary incursions that were planned and coordinated with local army commanders, who collaborated by supplying army clothing, ammunition, helicopter transport, and turning a 'blind eye' to paramilitary troop movement through military posts (Haugaard 2008). Several high-ranking officials have been charged, tried and found guilty of maintaining close relationships with the illegal paramilitary militias.[20]

[19] This was more than double the 8.200 foot-soldiers of 1990. However, after the exponential growth of the 90s, in the 00s FARC was severely cut back by the Colombian army backed by US military aid, and by 2008 FARC again had fewer than 9.000 soldiers (Pécaut 2008: 106).

[20] For example a Colombian court in 2009 convicted a retired army general of murder and sentenced him to 40 years in prison for his role in a 1997 massacre by paramilitary units. Here paramilitary death squads murdered 49 suspected guerrilla supporters in the village Mapiripán in the space of five days, even while the local judge made repeated calls to the military for protection. The sentence was the most severe imposed on a Colombian officer in a case of collusion with rightwing paramilitary units (Source: The Guardian 26/11-2009).

Militarization vs. reforms

A militarized solution to Colombia's problems with drug trade and armed conflict is an avenue that shifting US governments have supported by supplying Colombia's police and army with funds for material and training (see Zuluaga 2007 for a historical review of the US-Colombian relationship). In the year 2000 the huge US-supported Plan Colombia was launched as an *anti-drug* scheme consisting of military assistance (e.g. material like helicopters, creation and training of new counter-narcotics battalions and establishment of human rights units within the Colombian military), supplemented by a series of 'soft issues' including juridical reforms and alternative crop development to reduce drug cultivation and traffic. Plan Colombia has been criticized for a narrow focus on drugs and for largely ignoring the complexities of the country's ongoing armed conflict (Crandall 2002). Also militaristic in its outline was President Alvaro Uribe's (2002-2010) Democratic Security policy, which focused on upgrading and strengthening the national armed forces, raising the national defense budget from around 2.000 million dollars in 2000 to 3.600 in 2006 and 5.000 million dollars in 2010[21] - and re-establishing a permanent police or military presence in every Colombian municipality for the first time in decades (see Pizzaro and Bejarano 2003 for an analysis of Uribe's democratic security policy).

Colombia's national police force played a large role in the war against drugs in the 1980s, and in the process it became very militarized. Public examples were made of police officers whose involvement in this illegal business was exposed, as well as of other forms of police corruption and of extralegal assassinations (Frühling 2004: 8). This caused widespread distrust, and by the late 1980s the need to rehabilitate their reputation was deemed urgent. The national government launched reforms in 1988 and again in 1993, mainly in the larger cities, but the results were meager and few of the launched changes actually prospered. However, this gave way to a process of internal reflection that led to a second phase of "cultural change" inside the police force during the 1990s (Llorente 2004: 70) and in 1995 there was an internal purge of corrupt officers (Frühling 2004: 8). In 1998 a community police pilot project was launched in Bogotá by the National Police (I return to this later). This was formulated as a temporary initiative. The institutional management did not see it as a fundamental change for the police force, and only a limited number of officers were assigned to do community policing (Llorente 2004: 93). Simultaneously the country continued to receive international aid – mainly from the US – that, as mentioned above, focused primarily on bolstering the National Police's role in counter-narcotic operations. However, by militarizing the civilian

[21] *Source*: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 2000–2001.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. See also Colombia's Defense Ministry's homepage: www.mindefensa.gov.co

police forces the aid may have undermined national initiatives to increase accountability and democratize the police (Moncada 2009: 435).

From extremely high levels, during the 2000s Colombia saw an overall decline in its violence level, including homicides, kidnappings, massacres and almost all other types of criminal violence (World Bank 2011c). Also the overall number of reported torture cases has diminished considerably from 2004 to 2009 (Coalición Colombiana Contra la Tortura 2011: 9-10). The aggregated numbers conceal huge local differences among regions, localities and cities, however – and Bogotá is an interesting case for its impressive reduction in violence.

Part 2 – Case study of Bogotá's violence prevention approach

Introduction

Bogotá has more than 7 million inhabitants and the capital district is divided into 20 localities[22] – each governed by a local mayor and local administrative councils. The city mayor is head of the district government and the various district secretaries. The localities receive 10% of the district budget for local investments.

Figure 1: Bogotá's localities



[22] Locality # 20 Sumapaz is not listed nor shown on the map in Figure X. It is a very large mountainous area which lies to the city's south where few people live.

Mayor of Bogotá is considered the second most important political position in Colombia after the president. In 1988 political decentralization gave way for the direct election of mayors and town councils and the first popularly elected mayor of Bogotá was conservative Andres Pastrana (1989-1991), son of former Pres. Misael Pastrana. Then followed Jaime Castro (1992-1994) who is praised for serious efforts to ensure a healthy budget in the city and it was during his term that the citizenry began to demand improved security. His successors Antanas Mockus and Paul Bromberg (1995-1997)[23], Enrique Peñalosa (1998-2000), and for a second term Antanas Mockus (2001-2003), all showed political will to prioritize violence prevention and achieved impressive results. The subsequent mayors Luis Eduardo Garzón (2004-2007), Samuel Moreno Rojas and Clara López Obregón (2008-2011)[24], and Gustavo Petro (2012-2015) elected in October 2011 were all from the political left and have prioritized social policies higher than direct violence prevention initiatives and civic security. The story of violence prevention in Bogotá begins with the controversial former mayor Antanas Mockus.

Reversing the Violence Curves

In the 1994 municipal elections independent candidate Antanas Mockus was elected city mayor on a promise to enhance security in the city. The former math and philosophy professor and President of the National University in Colombia initiated a range of innovative political reforms and violence prevention initiatives. During Mockus' time as mayor security problems were treated as something entirely integrated into the broader policies of development of the city rather than a segregated specific challenge (Puente Burgos 2003: 52). He developed a violence prevention strategy with two central pillars: "civic culture" (*cultura ciudadana*) and "institutional legitimacy" (Mockus 1999: 13). The first step in the launched policy aimed at reducing citizens' indifference to violence, and then as a second step to engage citizens in partnering with the state to hold the institutions, in particular the police, accountable (Moncada 2009: 438). Mockus defined "civic culture" as: "customs, actions, and shared norms that generate a sense of belonging, facilitate urban coexistence, and produce respect for … the rights and duties of all citizens" (Mockus 1995), and to achieve this Mockus and his administration used a whole range of innovative, creative pedagogical tools. The total cost of the civic culture component during the three years 1995-97 was close to 130 million USD (equal to 3,7 % of the city budget) (Mockus 1999: 11). This work has been praised

[23] Antanas Mockus stepped down about a year before the end of his term, and Paul Bromberg replaced him on a promise to continue Mockus' work on violence prevention.

[24] Samuel Moreno Rojas was removed as mayor in May 2011 due to a corruption scandal and the Minister of Education María Fernanda Campos replaced him in an acting capacity until a new mayor was appointed in June 2011 namely Clara López Obregón from the political party *el Polo Democrático*.

as a unique example of how "even in the most difficult circumstances, creative and communicative pedagogy can be important tools of reducing the level of violence and facilitating peaceful coexistence among citizens" (Cala Buendía 2010: 31).

As mayor Antanas Mockus was a leading figure in fostering citizens' mobilization and engagement. He saw civic culture as the key to violence prevention, and believed that for people to behave like citizens, a troubling "gap between the legal, moral, and cultural regulatory systems of human behavior" had to be breached (Cala Buendía 2010: 27), i.e. individual or informal forms of regulation (autonomy and moral consistency) should harmonize with collective or formal forms of regulation (mutual regulation among citizens). Mockus sought to open new channels for communication between citizens and administrators by using creativity and arts to catch people's attention and interest in following rules and regulations. One example was the so-called traffic mimes, which stood at important crossroads, using humor to teach people correct behavior, e.g. to respect the traffic lights and avoid blocking the crossroads. Formulated in terms of rights and responsibilities, the aim was to promote and enhance a culture of citizenship, and make people aware of their condition as citizens and the importance their behaviors have for the city's development (Guerrero 2003: 17). Another example was the so-called "vaccinations against violence", which were two citywide campaigns held to sensitize citizens towards intrafamily violence. Here nearly 45,000 city residents met with mental health specialists to allow victims of abuse to express their feelings towards the aggressor (represented by a drawing or a dummy) in order to cope better with past acts of violence committed against them; finally people received a symbolic "vaccination" against future violence. The results achieved through these creative interventions showed Mockus that it *was* possible to deliberately modify collective habits and beliefs through public policies (Mockus: 2001: 1).

Simultaneously, in order to strengthen the legitimacy and credibility of public institutions like the police, the local government and others, a range of institutional reforms were launched. Internally in the city administration Mockus worked for more transparent and participatory processes as a replacement for old traditional clientelistic methods (Mockus 1999: 22). As an independent candidate Mockus stood outside political agreements and predefined alliances and he was able to introduce a new distance between the city administration's executive and legislative powers, i.e. the mayor and the city council. To Mockus accountability towards citizens was more important than internal political agreements and alliances. Mockus also sought to improve the city's public finances and adopted several unpopular measures, including an extra tax on gasoline and on the value of private property, to raise funds for violence prevention incentives and reforms. In his second term he was elected on a campaign slogan "110% for Bogotá" which urged the citizens to voluntarily pay 10% more taxes to improve the city finances. Initiatives were launched to facilitate payments of water, electricity and rates, e.g. the administration held bi-weekly

events in the popular neighborhoods where citizens could pay their bills and supermarkets began to receive payments. In 2002 a 16 million USD IDB loan supported the city administration's initiatives towards more transparency and better financial management of the public resources.[25]

Inspired by the "broken window" theory[26], Mockus' successor – public official, economist and administrator Enrique Peñalosa (1998-2000) – prioritized the rehabilitation of public spaces and improvements in infrastructure like public transportation as central for effective violence prevention. Peñalosa launched the program *Misión Bogotá* as a flagship program for enhancing security with particular emphasis on improving the physical environment and strengthening community involvement. He promoted a city model that gave priority to public spaces by relocating informal street vendors to closed spaces, democratizing transport by restricting private car use and building hundreds of kilometres of sidewalks, bicycle paths and pedestrian streets. Also the huge TransMilenio public bus rapid transport system was initiated under Peñalosa. (Note: For a discussion of Bogotá's experience with linking urban spaces to violence prevention see Súarez 2005).

Through an *Urban Renovation* program Peñalosa's administration worked to improve Bogotá's marginal neighbourhoods and particularly critical areas of the city with substantial infrastructural works such as parks, playgrounds and public libraries. In the center of the city a particular area that for decades had functioned as an illegal drug market was completely demolished and a huge park constructed. The investments cost about 3 million USD, which was raised by selling the public firm *Energía de Bogotá* (Guerrero 2003: 20). By developing a model for urban improvement based on the equal rights of all people to transportation, education, and public spaces, Peñalosa and his administration helped transform the city's attitude from one of negative hopelessness to one of pride and hope.

Peñalosa continued some of the violence prevention initiatives and policies initiated by Mockus. In 1999 the municipality formulated the program "Programa de Apoyo a la Convivencia y Seguridad del Distrito" as a project proposal and loan request to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). This was part of a 57 million USD loan subscribed by the IDB and the Colombian government to finance projects enhancing citizen security and preventing violence in Colombian cities [27] (see also Alda et al. 2006). Like Bogotá, the

[25] Source: http://www.iadb.org/idbamerica/index.cfm?thisid=2930

[26] The so-called "broken window" theory in criminology argues for a link between urban decay on the one hand and increasing crime, vandalism and anti-social behavior on the other. It maintains that citizens are less likely to take care of, for example, a public transport system that is dirty and covered with graffiti. Conversely, well-maintained and clean public spaces will help reduce crime and restore order (see also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Broken_windows_theory accessed 20/1-2012)

local governments of Cali and Medellin also negotiated individual contracts and became direct borrowers from IDB with the consent of the nation.[28] The loans to the municipalities were conditional on substantial local co-funding (about 50-50) (Moncada 2009: 435). In Bogotá the project activities were implemented from 1999-2006 and administrated by the government secretariat's new Distrito-IDB Coordinating Entity and the city's local mayors.[29] The initiated police reforms were continued and new activities launched in collaboration with the new community police department in particular with regard to rehabilitating public spaces (Llorente 2004: 72, 86). The number of Local Security Fronts and Security Schools in the city increased, suggesting that the municipal administration had the capacity to mobilize citizens to participate in violence prevention activities (ibid.).

Mockus returned as mayor in 2001 and continued many of the initiatives he had initiated during his first term, but he also promised to continue and finalize the infrastructure projects started by Peñalosa. In 2004 the former trade unions leader Luis Eduardo "Lucho" Garzón (2004-2006) was elected on a platform prioritizing social reforms with little political focus on security and the defense of life (Llorente 2005: 121). When the monthly updates on crime statistics revealed a rise in crime and violence - after almost a decade of steady decline – local media and citizens urged the mayor not to let go of the gains. Garzón bowed to the pressure and included citizens' security among his political priorities. This is an example of how "the early dissemination of crime statistics as part of lateral reforms consequently insulated police reform and citizenry security initiatives from backtracking due to a decrease in pro-reform political will" (Moncada 2009: 439).

Case examples from Bogotá

Since the early 1990s, more or less simultaneously with the launching of multi-sectoral violence prevention interventions in Bogotá, the city's homicide rates decreased from above 80 in 1992 to around 20 in 2006-2011. The applied violence prevention approach consists of five strategic areas (Guerrero: 9-10): (1) Research and systematic study of violence; (2) Institutional strengthening; (3) Education of the citizens and communication for peace; (4) Promotion of equality and social development, (5) Collaboration with the

[27] In Bogotá the loan from IDB was 10 million USD, and a further 6.6 million USD in co-funding came from the district (Llorente 2005: note 8).

[28] With an agreed-upon number: IDB??1086 OC-CO, the IDB financed a loan at the national level, and three other loans at the local level in the municipalities of Bogotá (10 million USD), Cali (15 million USD), and Medellín (12 million USD) (Buvinic, Alda and Lamas 2005: 1).

[29] See the complete project description here, link: http://www.alcaldiaBogotá.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=1803 (accessed 20/1-2012).

private sector. These five strategic areas of Bogotá's integrated multi-sectoral violence prevention approach are explored more closely below through six cases that draw on fieldwork conducted in Bogotá in October 2011.

Case 1 - Center for Analysis and Study of Citizens' Coexistence and Security[30]

Until 1995 data on violence and crime was scattered among several agencies and institutions such as the police, forensic institutions and hospitals, which each operated with different definitions and conceptualizations of violence and crime. In Cali mayor Guerrero and DESEPAZ had developed the first public health approach to violence prevention, induding a consistent epidemiological system surveying crime and violence (Guerrero 2001, 2003). Inspired by this, Mockus sought to improve data collection through launching the Unified Information System on Violence and Crime (*Sistema Unificado de Informacion de Violencia y Delincuencia*).[31] To establish a unified methodology and harmonize the used indicators a collaborative process was initiated among institutions working in this area, including the national police, prosecuting authority, traffic police, the health sector, forensic institutions, human rights office, metropolitan police and the city mayor's office. The objective was a system able to generate accurate and updated statistical data on crime and violence in the city. Subsequent administrations have shown the political will to continue the data collection. The entity was later renamed the Observatory of Violence and Delinquency of Bogotá, and the model has since been developed and implemented in many other cities and municipalities in Colombia and abroad. (NOTE: For an evaluation of the violence observatories implemented in 21 municipalities in Colombia see Gutierrez et al. 2007). Bogotá's violence observatory has developed into a strong and important research center with almost 100 staff called CEACSC (*Centro de Estudio y Análisis en Convivencia y Seguridad de Ciudadana*).

CEACSC is a municipal institution with the main objective of investigating and understanding conflicts, violence and crime that affect coexistence and security in Bogotá. The aim is to generate the necessary input for the design, implementation and evaluation of local public policies launched to prevent and control violence and crime. CEACSC has signed agreements with and collects data from entities like the Metropolitan Police, the national legal medical institute, the National Prosecutor's Office, the District Departments of Health and Traffic, the Regional Government and others.

[30] Links: http://www.gobiernobogota.gov.co/seguridad-y-convivencia/ceacsc and http://www.ceacsc.gov.co (accesses 20/1-2012)

[31] Inspiration was also drawn from the contemporaneous New York Police's *CompStat* crime and police statistical analysis system.

The data concerns the following types of crimes: homicides, deaths from traffic accidents, suicides, deaths from other types of accidents, general injuries, and theft of cars and motorbikes from individuals, homes, shops and banks. Moreover data is collected on blackmail, credit card theft, intrafamily violence, kidnapping and forced disappearances.

From the data CEACSC compile statistics on crime and violence that identify: time of day, date, context, characteristics of the victim, the weapon used, alcohol in blood of victims, and if possible the relation between victim and perpetrator. This information is geo-referenced to generate city maps indicating where, when and how violence and crime takes place. The identified particular problematic areas and particular vulnerable groups or urban conflicts are then further studied through ethnographic methods to generate additional data and insights. This data has also been used by researchers to explore, for example, temporal patterns in violent deaths and possible relations to the economic cycle in Bogotá (Moreno et al. 2009). Without proving any relation of causality, unemployment rates showed a close correlation with variations in violent deaths and the price index showed a relation only to homicides and violent deaths caused by accidents other than traffic (Ibid.: 27). Thus, it is possible to identify a temporal pattern in Bogotá's violent deaths and in particular the homicides, which calls for more research on geographic, socioeconomic and socio-demographic variables (Ibid).

Box 2: Lessons learned and advice from CEACSC

- To achieve successful violence prevention it is necessary to get a wide range of actors engaged in working towards this common goal.
- Security cannot be perceived as exclusively a police problem, but must be regarded as a problem of governance where a wide range of other institutions can be engaged.
- To implement solutions based on consensus, civil authorities must work closely with police and develop a shared view and perception of the security challenges.
- It is important to produce very clear diagnoses of the security problems and to share the information widely.
- Only by focusing data collection on measuring what is occurring on the streets is it possible to assess the effects of the implemented policies.
- Political will and continuity (as opposed to ruptures) are fundamental for a center to develop and improve its investigative capacities.
- There are no easy recipes, but the way forward is to continuously adjust efforts to the social realities in each place.

Case 2 – Police reforms and community policing in Bogotá

Colombia's first national police force was organized in 1891 with assistance from a commissar from France's national police force.[32]Over the ensuing decades, the national police acted as a liberal counterbalance to the dominant conservative influence within the Colombian military. The Constitution of 1991 established that the police force is a unique armed power, which is subordinated to the county's civil powers at both national and municipal level. Elected governors and mayors are therefore the top police authority within their respective geographic jurisdiction.[33] In Bogotá the first city mayor that began acting as *de facto* chief of the Metropolitan Police was Antanas Mockus, who worked towards aligning the police with the local government's policies. Reforms of the police were seen as necessary because examples of vigilantism began appearing in the city during the early 1990s and there was a growing sense that the public endorsed repressive illegal police methods.[34] Mockus' policies to reform and democratize the police had two steps: early dissemination of crime statistics to the public and implementation of measures to strengthen police accountability towards the local administration and the citizens (Moncada 2009: 432). The reform process was challenged by the city council's hardliners, who argued for a *mano dura* (iron fist) policy and opposed the idea of civil authorities increasing their control over the police (Moncada 2009: 436).

To improve the police and achieve the desired reforms, the district began to channel more resources to the Metropolitan Police. There has been a steady increase from 12.157 million USD under Jaime Castro (1994-1995) to 49.533 million USD during Mockus's first term (1995-1997). This was more than doubled to 116.107 million USD during Peñalosa (1998-2000) and in Mockus's second term (2001-2003) some 121.742 million USD went from the District to the Metropolitan Police unit. These resources were invested in technical modernization, vehicles, more Centers for Immediate Attention (CAI)[35], and training of police officers. Interestingly, the size of the Metropolitan Police unit has been maintained at around 15,000 officers from 1994 to 2006 in spite the city's growing population (Llorente 2004). So the implemented police reforms and growing budgets have not led to the hiring of *more* police, but been used to modernize equipment and improve the way police work is conducted, including liaison with the public. The applied

[32] For a historic review see the National Police's homepage, link: http://oasportal.policia.gov.co/portal/page/portal/INSTITUCION/Resena/Resena_Historica1

[33] Colombia's National Police is controlled by the Ministry of Defense and ultimately the President. In addition the three biggest cities: Bogotá, Medellin and Cali have particular Metropolitan Police units (in recent years more cities have got metropolitan police units), which are under the National Police but of which the city mayor is the chief. This dual system contains a structural tension between policies emanating from the municipal level and those from the institutions at the national level.

[34] For a brief popular description of the police reforms see Quesada 2004, link: http://www.iadb.org/idbamerica/index.cfm?thisid=2817

[35] CAIs are local "mini" police posts for example placed in a public park or on a square.

restructuring within the police also has had as its objective to diminish the bureaucratic workload and thus enable more officers to patrol the streets (Guerrero 2003: 18).

Some of the police reforms implemented in Bogotá were initiated by the city mayor and city council, others by the National Police. Emerging from a strongly militaristic tradition, the Colombian National Police has been engaged in a reform process since 1993 to introduce a greater sharing of police authority and civilian oversight (for more details see Goldsmith 2000). In 1998 the National Police launched, as mentioned above, a pilot project in Bogotá to test the internationally endorsed community policing model (Llorente 2004: 65). Community policing implies a shift from the traditional policing paradigm that emphasizes minimal interaction between police and society towards a type of preventive policing where close ties are established between police and citizens (Frühling 2004: 18). The aim is to increase security (by being preventive) and raise the accountability of the police towards the citizens. The model adopted in Bogotá drew on experiences from Spain and groups of police officers were sent to Barcelona to attend training courses in community policing (Quesada 2004). As part of the pilot project Local Security Fronts (FLS - *Frentes de Seguridad Local*) were established throughout Bogotá based on the model widely used in the US and the UK of neighborhood support networks that collaborate with the police. Local Security Fronts are community organizations led by the local police that aim to unite residents, foster peaceful co-existence and prevent crime. Ideally, the fronts are spaces where citizens and police meet to debate how best to combat security problems in the locality, and where trust and commitment can develop between police officers and citizens. By 2004 there were some 5,400 fronts in operation in Bogotá (Llorente 2004). Another initiative under the pilot project was the Citizen Security Schools (*Escuelas de Seguridad Ciudadana*), a pedagogical space where police informed citizens about the police's work and responsibilities, the penal code and how people could help to improve security in their locality (Frühling 2007: 137). Classes were conducted over weekends at the city's public universities from 1996 to 2004, and some 21,000 citizens from across Bogotá were informed about services and practices that the police are supposed to provide, and crime preventive actions that citizens can take (Frühling 2004: 19). A large share of the participants later joined their Local Security Front as leaders or members (Llorente 2004: 90).

After a few years the community policing pilot project was made permanent, and 31 police officials and 1033 police officers - selected for their aptitude for community interaction - received extensive training to become 'community police officers'. The new community police officers were assigned to a specific area and had to begin their service by conducting a household survey to meet the area's residents and understand their (security) concerns and everyday challenges (Llorente 2004: 78). Moreover, the community police officers had to engage in recreational activities, school visits and the like in their respective sectors to establish relations with youth and other vulnerable groups. The cost of implementing

these community policing reforms was about 2 million USD between 1998 and 1999 in training courses, equipment such as bicycles and communication.[36] This is close to 6 % of the national and municipal administrations' total budget line for Bogotá's Metropolitan Police in this period (Llorente 2004: 74) (see Box 2 below).

While there was positive collaboration between the National Police's community police pilot project and Bogotá's local government, the latter was not directly involved in the police reform initiative (Llorente 2004: 96) and the collaboration between the two institutions was never fluid (Ibid. 86). In this period the capital district launched its own initiatives to enhance police accountability towards the national and municipal authorities as well as the citizenry, such as:

- In 1995 the Metropolitan Police was assigned the task of regulating traffic in Bogotá, which hitherto had been under the national Transit unit, and this led to an important decrease in traffic accidents (Acero 2002: 368).
- The police code of conduct was revised in 1996 and changes made to make collaboration between community and police the foundational objective of the police's work.
- A participatory process was initiated where the police had to engage in dialogue with various social sectors who expressed their security concerns. In 1996-1997 nearly 400 community meetings were held where some 18,000 citizens participated and discussed how the police could be more accountable to city residents.
- To further horizontal accountability a wide array of interest groups were invited to voice their concerns - from human rights groups to traditionally marginalized groups such as prostitutes and representatives from the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community. The aim was more targeted police interventions, and based on the crime statistics these groups were able to hold the police accountable and demand improved actions and responses.
- Citizens were encouraged to stop by at local police offices with suggestions for improvements, which then would be passed on to the local mayor.

[36] The project receives support from various private actors, e.g. a phone company donated mobile phones to the police corps and Bogotá's Chamber of Commerce financed the training of police officers (Llorente 2004: 72).

Box 3: Lessons learned from Bogotá's community policing[37]

- Bogotá's community policing model improved the citizens' perception of the police, but its impact on crime statistics is not clear (Moncada 2009: 442. See also Llorente 2004).
- Concerted efforts were made to mobilize the citizens, which the local government saw as central for keeping the police accountable for the new objectives - not least because the citizens follow the police's performance and actions closely.
- To enhance and secure horizontal police accountability it is important to highlight the security needs of specific groups, such as the LGBT community or prostitutes.
- However, many citizens were unaware of the implemented police reforms, in particular the poorest segments of society, who are harder to reach and who experience an unequal power relation with the police that is difficult to alter Moncada 2009: 442).

Case 3 – Campaign for voluntary disarmament Vida Sagrada [38]

Vida Sagrada (Sacred Life) was initiated in 1996 as a project driven by activism, and later moved to the jurisdiction of the district governor's secretariat, thus depending on the mayor's ad hoc financing, until eventually it became a permanent preventive project in the district administration with its own budget line. Since then more than 20 campaigns have been conducted and by voluntary and spontaneous handovers 7.294 firearms and explosives and 105.107 ammunition units have been collected and destroyed.[39] In exchange people received a 150 USD voucher that was valid in supermarkets to purchase anything except alcohol and tobacco.

Handling firearms is considered a national defense theme under the responsibility of the national government, so the district needed permission to conduct the disarmament campaigns and a strict security protocol was followed. In Bogotá the actual handover of the weapons takes place in non-governmental

[37] In 2010 Colombia's national government has as a central element in the national security strategy launched a new police model based on the principle of 'community policing by quadrant' (*Vigilancia Comunitaria por Cuadrantes*). The model draws on experiences from the UK (London), Chile and the US. The objective is to form a closer relation between police and community, a more transparent and dedicated police force, and a detailed geo-referential system mapping crime and violence. The capital Bogotá has been divided into 743 areas or quadrants (*cuadrantes*) which are patrolled by 4.458 police officers. The areas vary in size according to crime and violence patterns and 6 officers are assigned to each area to patrol in pairs for 8 hour shifts. The local residents have the mobile number of "their" police officers in order to contact them directly in case of problems. The officers are supposed to be responsible for the same area for a period of 2 years in order to achieve local knowledge. This policing model which place citizens' security at the center is still very new and the effects have not yet been properly measured, but in the localities where it is functioning properly there are indications of important reductions in crime and violence. The outline of the new police structure can be consulted here, link: http://www.policia.gov.co/portal/page/portal/HOME/Lineamientos/TOMO%202.2.%20Seguridad%20Ciudadana.pdf (accessed 20/1-2012). For an analysis of the implementation see, link: http://www.semana.com/nacion/policia-cuadra/161794-3.aspx (accessed 20/1-2012)

[38] Link: http://www.gobiernobogota.gov.co/seguridad-y-convivencia/vida-sagrada (accessed 20/1-2012)

[39] Numbers from the homepage: http://www.gobiernobogota.gov.co/seguridad-y-convivencia/vida-sagrada/desarme (accessed 20/1-2012)

spaces such as churches. The Metropolitan Police unit guarded the collected firearms. In the first years the participating police officers wore civilian clothes, but according to later political agendas seeking to build confidence in the state institutions and legal armed forces, this was later changed so that they now wear uniforms. The collected firearms are handed over to the army's arms control department for inspection and destruction.

Box 4: Lessons learned and advice from Vida Sagrada

- Women are predominantly pro-disarmament and their power to motivate and convince men to hand in their firearm can be used strategically.
- The people who arrive to voluntarily hand over a firearm are often very eager to tell the story of that particular firearm - as if people seek some kind of therapy. It is thus recommended to provide a quiet, calm place where people can be listened to.
- Always accept all types of arms – legal and illegal, old and new, knives and firearms, as well as ammunition.
- If an economic incentive is used its value should be inferior - maybe only 20% - of the commercial value of the weapon.
- Always follow the law and existing regulations and stand out as a good example.
- Better results are achieved when the process has continuity, as opposed to sporadic, activist-driven disarmament events.
- The collected firearms must be destroyed or melted into something useful or symbolic of life.

The disarmament campaign Vida Sagrada has been very well received by the public and the media, is widely known and enjoys a very positive image. The campaign has strategically chosen to take a positive approach and promote life rather than death, i.e. not using pictures of blood and corpses, and also to make visible the person who never armed himself rather than casting those with arms as protagonists. Such programs have a role to play in a broader violence prevention intervention, because it is a way to eliminate a concrete firearm, which in itself is a risk. Furthermore, citizens who possess illegal weapons cannot use the existing regular channels for handing in firearms, which only accept those of legal origin. The voluntary disarmament campaign is therefore an opportunity for people to get rid of the firearm safely and without legal repercussions.

In addition to the indirect, educational attempts to alter citizens' habits, direct bans and restrictions on specific types of risky behavior were also implemented (see Box 3). The aim was to restrict circumstances considered to induce or trigger violent behavior and accidents, like the combination of misusing alcohol and carrying a weapon (Cala Buendía 2010: 22). The bans were accompanied by information campaigns promoting among citizens the moral stance that life should be protected above all other interests.

Box 5: Bans and restrictions

- *Temperance Law (Ley Zanahoria)* - To reduce alcohol-related deaths from traffic accidents and interpersonal violence a ban on sale of liquor after 1:00 am on weekdays and 2 am on weekends and holidays was implemented. This implied that bars, shops and discotheques selling alcohol were required to close at this hour. Information campaigns were launched to support the measure, which met resistance from bar owners and youth.
- *Prevention of traffic accidents* - Police enforcement was boosted to control drivers and sanctions against drunk drivers were increased significantly. This was supported by publicity campaigns informing about the consequences of driving drunk and improved infrastructure at specific spots with high accident rates.
- *"Women's night out"* - To raise public discussions about men as the main perpetrators of violence only women were allowed to "go out" in the city night life on specific days of the year.
- *Ban on carrying (legal) firearms* - With 80% of homicides perpetrated with firearms a complete ban on carrying (legal) firearms on special dates such as public holidays, paydays and some weekends led to immediate results. The ban was supported by administrative and police measures[40], and supplemented by voluntary disarmament campaigns (as explained above).
- *Prohibition of Fireworks* - The use of fireworks was prohibited to avoid accidents, in particular children getting burned, and deaths.

Case 4 - Reconciliation Network (Red de Reconciliación)[41]

Non-violent behavior is also promoted by the district in other projects and activities, from early prevention interventions in schools and kindergartens to support for adult grassroots initiatives. The Reconciliation Network is a project implemented by the district government secretary, which identifies and supports local organizations engaged in social activities related to peaceful coexistence and non-violent behavior. The project aims at constructing a culture of peace through facilitating and supporting local grassroots initiatives, and by sensitizing citizens about non-violent behavior, conflict resolution and co-existence.

The network does not provide economic support directly to the local initiatives, but supports by facilitating the local grassroots initiatives' process of developing annual work plans and achieving agreements with the local mayors about support. The network also offers local groups logistical support with implementing events and publicizing their activities in alternative media. Facilitators from the network conduct so-called 'schools of non-violence' where local grassroots activists are introduced to non-violence, from Gandhi to Nelson Mandela, human rights and actual national events. The aim is to change people's attitudes and encourage participants to go back to their communities and organizations and transmit the message to others. Local groups are also supported in the process of establishing coordination and collaboration among each other; some have joined forces and constructed Local Peace Councils to unite residents in common actions for peace and coexistence.

[40] The number of confiscated firearms rose from 6,000 in 1995, to almost 16,000 in 2003 (Cala Buendía 2010:23).

[41] Link: http://www.gobiernobogota.gov.co/seguridad-y-convivencia/red-distrital-de-reconciliaci%C3%B3n (accessed 20/1-2012)

The network has supported a wide range of interesting local activities and events. One example was the reclamation of a park as a public space in one locality. Most residents avoided the local park, which was considered unsafe because youth gangs hung out here. Several local organizations got together and with the support of the network planned and implemented a "positive" event in the park to alter the residents' perception. The event was a free open air cinema at night, free hot drinks for everyone and food from a communal food pot. The aim was to enhance trust and establish a feeling of community by getting people to see and recognize each other as residents across age, gender and cultural differences.

Box 6: Lessons learned and advice from the Reconciliation Network

- As facilitators it is important to believe in the project, that it matters and really *can* produce changes (most local people really believe in peace as a viable option).
- It is important to involve all types of people and not be afraid of establishing close contact with local actors.
- Acknowledge that people may be victims (of poverty, marginalization, etc.), but always treat them as resourceful individuals.
- Never make promises that cannot be kept.
- Be aware of – and try to avoid – welfarism, i.e. dependency on public funds.
- Use various platforms for expressing ideas and to mobilize locally, e.g. local radio stations and social networks like Facebook.

Case 5 – Reconciling violent youth groups[42]

Suba is one of Bogotá's 20 localities which each have their own local mayor and local council. For years the locality has had problems with violent clashes between different youth cultures, including football fans. The supporters have socially diverse backgrounds, but the common project of supporting the favorite team involves substance abuse and an often extremely violent comportment, including the use of weapons. The rival clubs clash both on the field and outside the stadium. In Suba each club controls a certain area which they consider "theirs" and where they hang out on weekends.

In 2009 one fan club leader approached the local District Government's Secretary for Social Affairs and proposed to engage fan club leaders in a collective participatory process to foment peaceful coexistence among rival groups. The local mayor liked the idea and decided to support the process. A youth counselor from the District Government's Secretary for Social Affairs was assigned to accompany and facilitate the process. The process initiated with a round table uniting 15 leaders from four clubs – all young males – and a work plan was developed that included a productive project and activities to foment conviviality and internal sensitization among the groups' members. The Secretary financed some of the launched activities, but it was financed mostly by private donations. The aim of the project was to foment mutual recognition

[42] Link: http://www.suba.gov.co/component/content/article/59/256-barras-bravas-en-convivencia (accessed 20/1-2012)

among the violent youth groups by facilitating a change in the leaders towards recognizing each other as individuals rather than enemies or rivals.

Box 7: Preventing violence among rival youth groups

- *Activities*: Charity activities were conducted. The 15 leaders and their fan clubs had to collect gifts and donations and organize a Halloween party for a group of poor children, and distribute donations to poor families at Christmas.
- A football tournament was held with teams from the fan clubs, the police, the local administration and other local actors. The event went well and was conducted without any problems.
- The 15 leaders were hired as "peace promoters" to visit local schools in pairs, to show that despite football rivalry it is possible to respect one another, and to promote the new non-violent fan culture to the students.
- A project has been initiated to produce caps, scarfs and t-shirts with the team colors for sale.
- The 15 leaders conducted mapping exercises of the locality to identify existing fan groups and their "territory".
- *Achievements*: The participatory process and social activities helped the 15 participating leaders to recognize each other as humans and not only as rivals.
- As role models the fan club leaders' change in attitude has influenced the members' behavior.
- As an outcome of this project the leaders have formed a local committee of football fan clubs, which is supposed to mediate tensions between the clubs and work as a filter for violent clashes. The local committee has written a code of conduct stipulating that:
- It is prohibited to carrying firearms and knifes; only fist fights are permitted.
- Fan clubs must respect each other's' territory and avoid trespassing - in particular on Fridays when the groups meet and hang out.
- The local committee members must be respected.
- Rather than tough behavior non-violent behavior at the stadiums is celebrated (e.g. the group that travels the most to follow their team, or that is best at singing, playing drums, making a noise and turning the stadium into a carnival is given respect).

Case 6 – Bogotá's Chamber of Commerce[43]

Broad collaboration across sectors and institutions – including commercial organizations, non-governmental organizations, research centers at universities, civil society organizations and interest groups – play an important role as partners and observers. Such actors may represent the citizens and cater for their interests in a safe and secure city by pressuring for continuity in the implemented policies. Providing financial and technical support may be one way to avoid simple "finger pointing" and foment a positive and constructive public-private relationship. One private actor that has worked with the local authorities in the area of violence prevention for a long time is Bogotá's Chamber of Commerce. The chamber was established in 1920 as a private organization catering for the interests of investors and businesses and

[43] For more information about the chamber's work with citizen security consult the website. Link: http://camara.ccb.org.co/contenido/contenido.aspx?catID=126&conID=6573 (accessed 20/1-2012)

working to make Bogotá safer and more attractive. It has been actively engaged in violence and crime prevention for decades – in particular with data collection and police reforms.[44]

The chamber runs a so-called 'observatory of security' where two specialized economists analyze official registrations of crime and violence based on data from the National Police and Forensic Institutes. Yearly victimization and perception surveys are conducted to measure violence and crime that is not reported to the police. To assess the citizens' perception of security is important because it is linked to quality of life, e.g. fear restricts people's mobility, and thus the surveys are complementary to analyzing the reported crime statistics. The chamber conducted its first victimization and perception survey in Bogotá in 1998; the questionnaire had 15 questions and was applied with a methodology of random capture of respondents in public places. In 2006 the questionnaire was expanded to 80 questions and a new method of home visits in 19 localities was used. [45]

This independent data collection and a thorough analysis of the survey results is used by the chamber to recommend and propose policies to the local government. As a non-governmental private entity the chamber can apply a long-term perspective independent of immediate political concerns. In recognition of the chamber's importance as a partner for the local government, it was made a member of the District Security Council in 2002. In this space the chamber can raise concerns and attempt to influence public policies in the area of citizens' security.

Institutional strengthening of the Metropolitan Police is another of the chamber's areas of work. By financing training, equipment and reforms towards community policing, the chamber has sought to improve security for businesses and citizens. With the program "secure zones" (*zonas seguras*) the chamber facilitates closer cooperation between local police, businesses and citizens in commercial or particularly populated zones. The program began with 15 zones and 80 officers assigned to permanently patrol them (Acero 2002: 368), and in 2003 it was enlarged to encompass 16 additional zones with more police officers. Another example of how the chamber engages in improving citizens' security and influencing public policies was an agreement signed in 2007 by a coalition of LGBT business owners, the local government and the chamber to collaborate in improving security in the localities where the LGBT community is most visible

[44] For a video introduction of the chamber's work see link: http://www.escuelapnud.org/es/videos/viewvideo/73/seguridad-ciudadana/los-observatorios-de-seguridad-y-las-encuestas-de-victimizacion-en-bogota-dc.html (accessed 20/1-2012)

[45] Survey results can be found here, link: http://www.atlas.com.co/webatlas/sia_blog/ (accessed 20/1-2012)

(e.g. special clubs and bars).[46] The police were also involved in the process and to improve their interventions, police officers were trained in the specific needs of this group and a specific office dedicated to handle only LGBT security concerns was established. The chamber has also given donations to improve the police's emergency capacity (response time to 911 emergency calls) and financed 11 mobile units where crimes can be reported.

Based on several decades of experience, the chamber has gathered valuable insight into some of the most important elements for successful inter-sectorial collaboration in violence prevention (see Box 7).

Box 8: Lessons learned and advice from Bogotá's Chamber of Commerce[47]

- To evaluate public policies properly the private actor needs tools and information. One way to get this is through independent information gathering. A database with accurate information is essential for measuring the impact of new policies.
- For the private actors to be able to influence decisions in public policies the relationship needs to be proactive and constructive. Critique thus needs to be accompanied by suggestions of how to solve the identified problems.
- It is important to ensure that there is technical and institutional capacity to execute the public policies properly. Thus to assist and help the authorities it may be necessary to provide financial and technical support.
- Private actors engaging in private-public relations need to be patient because it takes time to 'earn' recognition and trust from the authorities.
- Private actors who speak for the citizens ought to promote citizens' participation, and be ready to work and communicate closely with them.

[46] The text of the agreement can be found here, link: http://www.ceacsc.gov.co/index2.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=27&Itemid=46 (accessed 20/1-2012)

[47] The model of public-private collaboration in the area of community security that Bogotá's Chamber of Commerce has developed has recently been 'exported' to Panama and Mexico. Together with the World Bank and the International Center for the Prevention of Crime, the Chamber published a guide for "Public-private alliances for community security" in 2011. The guide suggests strategies and actions that can improve citizens' quality of life and environments that are safer and more competitive. It presents experiences from many countries of private businesses' engagement in community security and argues for the importance of private-public collaboration in these matters. So private businesses and interest organizations may play important roles due to their capacity to support public violence prevention policies, but the citizens themselves are also important actors for a change towards a safer city. Link to the guide: http://www.empresario.com.co/recursos/page_flip/CCB/2011/guia_alianzas_publico_privadas/

Chapter 5: Discussion of Bogotá's violence prevention experience

From this study's exploration of multi-sectoral violence prevention experiences in Colombia, and in particular Bogotá , there are some thematic areas that stand out for their key role in the overall violence prevention policy and as explanations for the relative success. These are (a) Research and systematic study of violence; (b) Institutional strengthening; (c) Police reform; (d) Balancing immediate and long-term impact interventions; (e) Targeting at-risk groups; and finally (f) The usability of Bogotá as a model case.

A) Research and systematic study of violence

Inspired by the epidemiological public health approach to violence prevention surveys, data collection and mappings have figured as very central in the applied policies of Cali, Medellín and Bogotá (Case 1). The importance of exact and systematic data collection for Bogotá's positive results in violence prevention are manifold. Firstly, establishing an independent data collection system enabled the local government to make its own assessments independent of the police's perspective. Secondly, accurate crime and violence statistics proved very useful for developing policies and programs – for example to identify particular problematic zones or 'hot spots' that required focused interventions - and subsequently to closely monitor effects and impacts. Finally, accurate information turned out to be a central political tool for securing continuous support for the launched violence prevention initiatives. The statistical data was widely disseminated through monthly newsletters, press conferences with the mayor, community briefings and media releases so that the citizens could follow and assess the effects of the local government's violence and crime prevention efforts. On this basis negative developments could quickly be detected and a public clamor for improvements raised.

B) Institutional strengthening

In Bogotá's violence prevention experience there are several examples of institutional reforms, and new institutions or councils established to strengthen the local government's work with violence prevention. To strengthen the *internal policies*, the city mayor established in 1995 a special advisory unit to enhance the district's concerted violence prevention efforts. This unit has been continued by subsequent administrations and is today regarded as a central pillar in Bogotá's violence prevention success.[48] To have such a group of specialized professionals dedicated to think about and analyze this problematic has improved the local

[48] Link: http://www.gobiernobogota.gov.co/seguridad-y-convivencia/subsecretar%C3%ADa-de-seguridad-y-convivencia (accessed 20/1-2012)

government's understanding of crime and violence in the city and informed the adopted policies (Gutierrez 2003: 16).

To strengthen the *external relations* a District Security Council was established in 1996 in Bogotá, uniting representatives from the district secretariats, police department, public defender and the local mayors, and led by the city mayor.[49] Parallel local councils were formed in Bogotá's 20 localities.[50] Having this inter-sectoral entity in Bogotá had several positive effects. Firstly, it functioned as a steering committee led by the mayor where the participating institutions could analyze developments and coordinate their work. Secondly, because the participating institutions were all leading agencies in their own sector, e.g. police, justice and health, the concerted decisions taken in this inter-sectoral space secured proper implementation and follow-up on the violence prevention policies across the sectors.

C) Police Reform

The police force is a central actor in security and violence prevention efforts – and also a very tangible manifestation of the state on the street, which historically is highly unaccountable in Latin America (Moncada 2009). Police reforms may face many obstacles jeopardizing their relative success. Revising the police code of conduct and introducing community policing were elements in making police more accountable to state and society. However, the main reason for success was the increased and informed citizen support and participation, partly based on up-to-the-minute, accurate statistical data, which became source for citizens to hold politicians and institutions accountable for continuous efforts.

What made the police reform succeed in Bogotá was the political strategy used to implement it. It was a lateral reform, strategically altering the societal context in order to increase public support for reform processes, i.e. to get the citizens to demand more accountable policing. The experience of Bogotá shows that a sequence of policies shaping the societal context in which the police reform occurs enhances the likelihood of success, and conversely, replicating police reforms alone without the context of citizens' support and participation may hamper increased accountability (Moncada 2009). Regular surveys

[49] The system of national, departmental and local security councils was in fact launched by the national government to provide spaces where various actors could express their security concerns and inform the adopted policies. The national system is described in Decree 1028 of 1994, link: http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=3293 (accessed 20/1-2012)

[50] The decree regulating the local security councils is found here, link: http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=19680(accessed 20/1-2012). For an example of how a local security council works see the following slide-show from the locality Puente Aranda in Bogotá. Link: http://www.puentearanda.gov.co/descargas-documentos/doc_download/143-presentacion-consejo-de-seguridad-diciembre-2011 (accessed 20/1-2012)

conducted during the late 1990s and 2000s have found that concomitantly with the implemented police reforms, citizens in Bogotá expressed a more and more positive opinion about the police, in other words the reforms led to an improvement in the police's image (Moncada 2009: 442). However, it also found that the community policing initiative in Bogotá had no direct effects on crime rates, nor on the citizens' perceptions of insecurity (Llorente 2004: 101).

As a part of the police reform and in order to enhance citizens' informed participation and engagement in improving local security, the police initiated Local Security Fronts and Citizens Security Schools. Citizens participating in these activities might have developed a closer relation to the local police, whereas those who did not join the initiatives may have been excluded from the community work or even opened themselves to suspicion.[51] For example youth groups with an alternative culture may be considered 'criminals' or 'unwanted' in the area by the more established security front members (often middle-aged males, community leaders and business owners). It remains an open question how well the Local Security Councils function on the ground across Bogotá's localities. A recent study on local justice and security programs in Colombia by Eric Scheye (2011) found that local neighborhood leaders in the huge, popular barrio Ciudad Bolivar in Bogotá had "seen nothing of the new community policing" initiative of the Colombian National Police (Ibid.: 11). Nor have the locality seen any real functioning of the local security councils where civilian authorities would meet with the police regularly to discuss security issues. Interviewed municipal officials blame this malfunctioning in the city's poorest and most vulnerable areas on budgetary constraints, lack of sufficient administrative personnel or lack of political will all the way down to the local level to implement district policies (Ibid.: 11, note 11). Thus, there may exist an important gap between the policies and reforms on paper and the actual implementation that would require further investigation to uncover.

D) Balancing short- and long-term impact interventions

While it is widely recognized that bans and restrictions to control alcohol consumption and the bearing of firearms may have immediate effects on violence levels, exact evidence is scarce (Moreno and Sánchez 2009: 27). One study assessing the anti-gun policies and other security measures implemented in Bogotá from the mid-1990s found an association between firearm control and variations in homicides (Aguirre et al. 2009). However, the effect of firearm control is localized and dependent on for example weekdays so

[51] During the fieldwork in Bogotá I talked to one security guard about security in his area of residence and he mentioned the Local Security Front as very efficient. The members were local business owners who patrolled the area 24/7. To my question of what they would do to a thief caught in the act he answered: "Oh, they are caught and then handed over to the paramilitary urban militias, who take good care of them. The system is very efficient and our neighborhood is almost 100% cleansed from petty thieves." (Interview security guard, male, 45, Bogotá, October 2011)

that restrictions and enforcements like road blocks and searches applied only on weekends appear to "relocate" events of criminal violence to areas or week days with less control (Ibid: 50). The conclusion is that only when the restrictions are strictly enforced are there positive results in the form of a reduction in the rate of homicide by firearm (Ibid. 51). Another study argues that the crucial factor seems to be how bans and control measures were supported by other initiatives attempting to "modify citizens' behaviors through communications, education and pedagogical activities, and artful interventions" (Cala Buendía 2010: 24). One such example is the promotion of non-violent behavior through cultural changes in the voluntary disarmament campaign Vida Sagrada (Case 3), which would only show its putative effects in the long term. Again, while Bogotá's overall achievements in violence prevention are impressive and appear quite robust, at the level of projects and specific interventions the evidence of what works is very limited.

E) Targeting at-risk groups

Among the violence prevention initiatives there are several targeting youth as a specific at-risk group. The interventions are aimed at reducing youth violence and diminishing risk factors through skills training, income generating projects, promotion of peaceful coexistence (Case 5), and recreational activities after school and on weekends.[52] Projects for at-risk youth in Bogotá have been extensively evaluated and their impacts are mixed. Evaluations of a technical skills training project found that participation did not enable youth to get a job (Cendex 2003b), while school training did enable most youth to re-enter formal education (Cendex 2003b). Recreational projects seem to have had positive effects by generating change in perceptions of violence among the participants and reinforcing peaceful coexistence as a value (Cendex 2003b).

Evaluations of similar projects in Medellín, where vulnerable children aged 6-18 in the city's popular neighborhoods were given the opportunity to participate twice a week in sports activities at public sports schools, found some positive impacts in improved self-esteem and time spent on collective leisure activities rather than alone (Econometría 2006: 53-54). However, qualitative and quantitative evaluations of participants in the 29 public sports schools did not identify the expected results in terms of care for the body and peaceful conflict resolution (Ibid. 55).[53] The effects of such projects targeting at-risk youth thus remain unclear.

[52] For an overview of some of the violence prevention projects for youth implemented in Colombia see Gutiérrez 2007, 2006a, 2006b.

[53] The Program of Popular Sports Schools was implemented in 2001-2005 as a part of the security and coexistence program financed by an IDB loan under the component addressing at-risk youth. The total cost of the security and coexistence program was 25 million USD, and the coexistence component used 11,7 million USD (47%) (Econometría 2006: 3). After 2005 the sports schools were continued, but financed by the municipality's own resources (Ibid.:12).

F) The usability of Bogotá as a model case

Political scientist Llorente cautions that the case of Bogotá's violence prevention experience "is not a finished model but a process in construction" (Llorente 2005: 110) and using it as a referent for other local violence prevention programs should be done with caution. While it is an exemplary case for its municipal management, leadership and continuation of policies from one administration to the next, it has not been sufficiently documented which interventions were more or less efficient (Ibid.: 121). For example, the many projects launched under the large IDB loan had no clear indicators or targets, and are therefore almost impossible to evaluate (Abuleafia 2010: 24).

What has become most emblematic for Bogotá's successful violence prevention experience is perhaps the strong focus on fomenting civic culture and creating long-term moral changes to ensure the peaceful coexistence promoted by Antanas Mockus. However, this is also one of the areas where very little documentation exists on the interventions' impact and efficiency (Ibid.: 117). One IDB evaluation of the implemented citizens security and peaceful coexistence programs in Bogotá and Medellin comparing treated and non-treated groups found a difference in attitude towards violence, but no difference in violence levels (Abuleafi 2010: 24). Others, however, have questioned whether it is at all meaningful to attribute achievements in violence reduction to a "cultural change" or "change of norms" happening within such a relatively brief time (Llorente, Escobedo, Echandía and Rubio 2002). Rather than relating a rise or fall in crime and violence rates to changes in the citizens' morality, these researchers claim, they should be related to criminals, the actors who are the main source of violence and crime. In other words, according to this camp, directing interventions at ordinary citizens is at best ineffective and policies and special efforts should rather target criminal networks directly (Ibid.). In sum, while Bogotá is an example of the important achievements in violence prevention since the mid-1990s it is highly debatable exactly what elements of the multi-sectoral approach turned the curves and enabled a steady decline. However, there are some important general conclusions and lesson learned that can be drawn from the case.

Chapter 6: General conclusions and lessons learned

This study was launched and conducted with two objectives: (1) to provide insights into good practice in violence prevention in urban contexts with high levels of violence, in particular the prevention initiatives launched by city mayors and local authorities; and (2) to provide inspiration and orientation to civil society groups and others who are engaged in fomenting effective violence prevention interventions. Using the concept of human security as the analytical frame of the study has ensured that both bottom-up and top-down violence prevention strategies have been identified and explored.

The in-depth case study of violence prevention in Colombia's capital Bogotá underlined the local government's leading role. Since the mid-1990s comprehensive multi-sectoral violence prevention interventions and public policies have been launched in Bogotá, and the violence levels decreased in more or less the same period, with homicide rates falling from above 80 hhti in 1992 to around 20 hhti in 2006-2011. The violence prevention approach adopted in Bogotá under the leadership of the local government is exemplary in its use of a human rights based approach to violence prevention and development. It is an important example of how comprehensive multi-sectoral interventions used simultaneously can empower citizens to demand increased accountability (from below) and work towards institutional strengthening of state institutions to become more legitimate and responsive to their obligations to respect, protect and fulfil fundamental human rights (from above).

What this study's exploration of the literature and the case of Bogotá shows is that it is possible to achieve important results in violence prevention when *political will* across shifting mayors and administrations secures *continuity* for the launched policies, projects and interventions. For Bogotá the key to political will and continuity was an adequate balancing of immediate results from short-term intervention impacts, which fostered a growing confidence that *change is possible* among the public, local politicians and administrators, and thus secured continuous support for the violence prevention interventions and allowed time for long-term impacts of the prevention initiatives to materialize. On the basis of the study's in-depth case study and review of publications on violence prevention initiatives in Colombia the following key findings and lessons learned about how to implement efficient violence prevention with a human security frame have been drawn:

- Violence is caused by a complex interaction between multiple risk factors and violence prevention, and it therefore requires comprehensive multi-sectoral and integral interventions implemented across sectors like education, health, social protection and urban development.
- To coordinate such comprehensive multi-sectoral violence prevention interventions, local governments with strong leadership are important actors. As they are responsible for service provision within health, education, infrastructure and local security arrangements, local governments, city mayors and administrations occupy key positions from where to coordinate and improve efforts in areas central for violence prevention.
- To optimize resources and impacts, comprehensive violence prevention initiatives need to be implemented in close collaboration with a variety of institutions and actors from the public to the private, including the academic milieu, NGOs, churches, grassroots organizations, etc.
- Violence prevention interventions need to focus on problematic areas, at-risk groups and communities most vulnerable to violence identified using reliable baseline data and statistics. With systematic data collection it is also possible to evaluate and measure the interventions' impacts.
- Successful multi-sectoral violence approaches balance prevention and repression, including interventions to improve sanctions of lawbreakers and incarceration of dangerous elements, as well as rehabilitation of delinquents and attention to the victims of crime and violence.
- Strengthening state institutions' ability to protect and guarantee people's safety may enhance citizens' trust and confidence in them. Reforms of security forces therefore need to demilitarize them and increase their transparency and accountability to civil authorities and the population.
- Reducing citizens' indifference to violence – from domestic to police violence – is a first step towards empowering them to be active participants in violence prevention initiatives. Citizens preoccupied with effective violence prevention can play key roles by for example holding institutions like the police accountable for their actions and omissions and pressure politicians to keep the issue on the agenda.

References

Abuelafia, Emmanuel (2010) An evaluation of the support for peaceful coexistence and citizens' security: Bogotá and Medellín. Washington: IDB. Link: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=35572731

Acero, Hugo (2002) Reducción de la violencia y la delincuencia en Bogotá, Colombia, 1994-2002. In: *Biomédica* 22, suppl. no. 2, p. 362-372.

Acero, Hugo (2005) *Sistemas de información de violencia y delincuencia: herramienta para la gestión de la seguridad y la convivencia*. Link: http://www.iadb.org/document.cfm?id=918706

Agudelo, ME (2005) Descripción de la dinámica interna de las familias monoparentales, simultáneas, extendidas y compuestas del municipio de Medellín, vinculadas al proyecto de prevención temprana de la agresión. In: *Revista Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Niñez y Juventud* 3(1), p. 153-179. Link: http://www.umanizales.edu.co/revistacinde/vol3/art6.htm

Aguirre, K; Becerra, O; Mesa, S and Restrepo, J (2009) *Assessing the Effects of Policy Intervention on Small Arms Demand in Bogotá, Colombia*. Documentos de CERAC, #14, Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos, Bogotá.

Alda, E; Buvinic, M and Lamas, J (2006) Neighborhood Peacekeeping: The Inter-American Development Bank's Violence Reduction Programs in Colombia and Uruguay. In: *Civil Wars* 8(2), p. 197-214.

Aos, S., Millar, M., and Drake, E. (2006) Evidence-based public policy options to reduce future prison construction, criminal justice costs, and crime rates. Washington State Institute for Public Policy, Olympia, WA.

Aos, S. Lieb, R., Mayfield, J., Miller, M., and Pennuci, A. (2004) Benefits and costs of prevention and early intervention programs for youth. Washington State Intitute for Public Policy, Olympia, WA.

Ardila, Edgar (2005) *Experiencias y desafíos en justicia comunitaria y alternativa: Elementos para examinar los programas.* Paper presented at: Foro Internacional Interamericano sobre Seguridad y Convivencia en Medellín, Colombia, 12/9-2005. Link: http://www.iadb.org/document.cfm?id=920236

Ardila, Z (2003) Resultado final de la evaluación de las Campañas. Link: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=924867

Ardila, Z (2003) Resultados finales de la evaluación de los talleres de la unidad coordinadora de prevención integral – UCPI . Link: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=924995

Ardila, Z (2003) Resultados preliminares de la evaluación de los talleres de la unidad coordinadora de prevención integral – UCPI. Link: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=924549

Avilés, W. (2001) 'Institutions, Military, Policy, and Human Rights in Colombia', *Latin American Perspectives,* 28(1): 31-55.

Avilés, W. (2006) 'Paramilitarism and Colombia's Low-Intensity Democracy', *Journal of Latin American Studies,* 38(2): 379-408.

Ball, P; Guberek, T; Guzman, D; Hoover, A and Lynch, M (2008) Assessing claims of declining lethal violence in Colombia. Human rights data analysis group, Benetech Human Rights Program, Palo Alto, California. Link: http://www.hrdag.org/resources/publications/CO-PN-CCJ-match-working-paper.pdf

Beckett, K and Godoy, A (2010) A Tale of Two Cities: A Comparative Analysis of Quality of Life Initiatives in New York and Bogotá. In: *Urban Studies*, 47(2), p. 277-301.

Bonilla, L (2009) *Demografía, juventud y homicidios en Colombia, 1979-2006.* Documentos de trabajo sobre Economía Regional, #118. Bogotá, Colombia: Banco de la Republica. Link: http://www.banrep.gov.co/documentos/publicaciones/regional/documentos/DTSER-118.pdf

Briceño-León, R; Villaveces, A; and Concha-Eastman, A (2008) Understanding the uneven distribution of the incidence of homicide in Latin America. In: *Int. J. Epidemiol*. 37 (4), p. 751-757.

Buvinic, Mayra (2008) Un balance de la violencia en América Latina: los costos y las acciones para la prevencón. In *Revista de pensamiento iberoamericano* #2, Spain 2008.

Buvinic, M; Morrison, A; and Shifter, M (nd.) La Violencia en América Latina y el Caribe: Un Marco de Referencia para la Acción. Washington: IDB.

Buvinic, M., Alda, E., and Lama, J. (2005) *Emphasizing Prevention in Citizen Security. The IBDs contribution to reducing Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington: IDB.

Cala Buendia, Felipe (2010) More carrots than sticks: Antanas Mockus' civic culture policy in Bogotá. In: *New Directions for Youth Development*, 125, spring, p. 19-32.

Castro, Jorge Daniel (2005) El rol de la policía colombiana en la prevención de la violencia: Una estrategia nacional de convivencia y seguridad ciudadana. Link: http://www.iadb.org/document.cfm?id=919974

Coalición Colombiana contra la Tortura (2011) *Informe de Seguimiento a las recomendaciones del Comité contra la Tortura y Otro Tratos o Penas Crueles, Inhumanos o Degradantes de Naciones Unidas, Colombia 2009-2010*. Bogotá, Colombia.

Cohen, M and Rubio, M (2007) *Solutions paper: Violence and crime in Latin America*. Paper presented at Consulta de San José, Costa Rica 22-26 Oct. 2007.

Concha-Eastman, Alberto (2005) Ten years of a successful violence reduction program in Bogotá, Colombia. Paper presented at conference: Preventing Violence. From Global Perspectives to National Action. Liverpool, March 10th-11th 2005, p. 13-18. Link: http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd53/violence-Bogotá.pdf

Crandall, Russel (2002) Clinton, Bush and Plan Colombia. In: *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 44(1).

Dammert, Lucía (2005) Prevención comunitaria del delito en América Latina: desafíos y oportunidades . In: *Desafíos*, 13, p. 124-157.

Dudley, S. (2004) *Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia,* New York: Routledge

Duque, LF (2011) *Public policy to promote human security: Medellin, Colombia, Experience*. Presentation at PAHO Seminar. University of Antioquia, Medellín: Colombia. Link: http://new.paho.org/hq/index.phpoption=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=16297&Itemid=

Duque, LF; Orduz , JF; Sandoval, JJ; Caicedo, BE and Klevens, J (2007) Lecciones del programa de prevención temprana de la violencia, Medellín, Colombia. In: *Rev Panam Salud Publica*, 21(1) Link: http://www.scielosp.org/pdf/rpsp/v21n1/a03v21n1.pdf

Econometría (2006) Medición de impactos del programa de Escuelas populares del deporte de la Alcaldía de Medellín. Informe Final Revisado. Alcaldía de Medellín. Link: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=924170

Fearon, James (2010) Homicide data, third revision. Background paper prepared for the WDR 2011 team. In: *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development*, World Bank. Link: http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/homicide

Franco, S. (2003) A social-medical approach to violence in Colombia. In: *American Journal of Public Health*, 93(12), p. 2032-2036.

Friis-Hansen, E and Kyed, H (2009) *Participation, Decentralization and Human Rights. A Review of Approaches for Strengthening, Voice and Accountability in Local Governance.* Washington: World Bank/Copenhagen: DIIS. Link: http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Subweb/Fremtidens-bistand/Local%20governance%20_DIIS%20%20-%20FINAL%20_2_.pdf

Frühling, Hugo (2004) La policía comunitaria en América Latina: Un análisis basado en cuatro estudios de caso. In: *Calles más seguras: Estudios de policía comunitaria en América Latina*. Link: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=419932

Frühling, Hugo (2007) The impact of international models of policing in Latin America: the case of community policing. In: *Police Practice and Research*, 8(2), p. 125-144. -

Gallego, C. (1990) 'Autodefensas, paramilitares y narcotráfico en Colombia: Origen, desarrollo y consolidación: el caso" Puerto Boyacá"'. Bogotá, Colombia: Editorial Documentos Periodísticos.

García, MV (2000) Experiencias en la resolución pacífica de conflictos en Medellín. Link: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=926648

Gaviria, Alejandro (2000) Increasing returns and the evolution of violent crime: the case of Colombia. In *Journal of Development Economics* 61, pp. 1-25. Link: http://agaviria.uniandes.edu.co/papers_pub/Increasing_Returns_and_the_Evolution_of_Violent_Crime_The_Case_of_Colombia.pdf

Gilgen, E and Tracey, L (2011) Contributing evidence to programming: Armed violence monitoring systems. Geneva: UNDP and Geneva Declaration.

Goldsmith, Andrew (2000) Police Accountability Reform in Colombia: The Civilian Oversight Experiment. In: *From Civilian Oversight of Policing: Governance, Democracy and Human Rights*, Goldsmith and Lewis (eds), New York: Hart Pubslishing.

Guerrero, Rodrigo (2001) Prevención de la violencia a nivel municipal. Washington: IDB Link: http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd63/RodrigoGuerrero.pdf

Guerrero, Rodrigo (2003) *Violencia y exclusión las experiencias de Cali y Bogotá, Colombia.* Washington: World Bank. Link: http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd65/GuerreroViolencia.pdf

Gutiérrez, G (2003) *Estrategias para la prevención temprana de la agresión en los niños. Manual para los Asesores de Familia - Versión 2*. Secretaria de Educación, Medellín. Link: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=925233

Gutiérrez, MI (2007) *Caracterización de Experiencias de prevención de violencia con participación de jóvenes en Colombia*. Pan American Health Organization/GTZ. Bogotá.

Gutiérrez, MI (2006a) *Jóvenes, participación y prevención de la violencia en políticas públicas. El caso de Colombia.* OPS; GTZ, Washington; OPS; Link: http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd66/CasoColombia.pdf

Gutiérrez, MI (2006b) *Experiencias participativas con jóvenes en proyectos de promoción del desarrollo y prevención de la violencia. El caso de Colombia.* OPS; GTZ, Washington: OPS; 153 p. Link: http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd66/experiencia/experiencia.html

Gutiérrez, MI; Arango, OA; Ariza, C; and Guerrero, R (2004) *Estado del arte sobre comportamientos conductas, normas culturales de la población asociados a comportamientos agresivos en las ciudades de Bogotá, Medellín y Cali*. Ministerio de la Protección Social; Universidad del Valle; Instituto Cisalva.

Gutiérrez, MI; Espinosa Del Villin, R; Fandiño, A and Oliver, RL (2007) The evaluation of a surveillance system for violent and non-intentional injury mortality in Colombian cities. In: *International journal of injury control and safety promotion* 14(2), p. 77-84.

Harcourt, BE. and Ludwig, J. (2006) Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment. In: *The University of Chicago Law Review,* 73(271). Link: http://home.uchicago.edu/~ludwigj/papers/Broken_windows_2006.pdf

Haugaard, L. (2008) 'The Other Half of the Truth, Searching for Truth, Justice and Reparations for Colombia's Victims of Paramilitary Violence'. Washington: Latin America Working Group.

Henao, J (2005) La prevención temprana de la violencia: una revisión de programas y modalidades de intervención. In: *Univ. Psychol. Bogotá* 4(2), p.161-177. Link: http://www.scielo.org.co/pdf/rups/v4n2/v4n2a05.pdf

Hernandez, LJ (2003) Evaluación de Resultados e Impactos de un Modelo de Salud Mental Basado en la Comunidad en Localidades de Bogotá, DC . In: *Revista de salud pública* 5(3), p. 272-83. Link: http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0124-00642003000300004&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es

Hunt, S. (2009) 'Rethinking State, Civil Society and Citizen Participation. The Case of the Colombian Paramilitaries', *Behemoth. A Journal of Civilisation,* 1**:** 64-87.

IDB (2003) *Guidelines for the design of Violence Reduction Projects*. Best Practice Series. Washington: IDB.

Kjaerulf, F and Barahona, R (2010) Preventing violence and reinforcing human security: a rights-based framework for top-down and bottom-up action. In: *Rev Panan Salud Publica* 27(5), p. 382-395.

Klevens, J and Montoya, EM (2003) Un abordaje de la violencia desde la salud publica: el Proyecto de Prevención Temprana en Medellín. In: *Revista de salud publica* 5(1), p. 24-39. Link: http://www.scielo.org.co/pdf/rsap/v5n1/v5n1a03.pdf

Llorente, MV (2005) Otra mirada a la experiencia de seguridad y convivencia en Bogotá. In: *Quórum. Revista de pensamiento iberoamericano* (12), autum, p. 110-125.

Llorente, MV (2004) La experiencia de Bogotá: contexto y balance. In: Frühling, H (ed.) (2004) Calles más seguras: Estudios de policía comunitaria en América Latina. Link: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=419932

Llorente, MV; Escobedo, R; Echandía, C; and Rubio, M (2002) Violencia homicida y estructuras criminales en Bogotá . In: *Sociología Porto Alegre*, 4(8), p. 172-205.

McIlwaine, C and Moser, C (2004) Drugs, alcohol and community tolerance: an urban ethnography from Colombia and Guatemala. In: *Environment and Urbanization*, 16(2), p. 49-62.

McIlwaine, C and Moser, C (2000) *Urban poor perceptions of violence and exclusión in Colombia: La violencia y la exclusión en Colombia: según la percepción de comunidades urbanas pobres.* Washington: World Bank. Links: http://go.worldbank.org/WN0VQ5CC70 Spanishttp://go.worldbank.org/L2LYMUF360 English.

Melo, Jorge Orlando (2009) Cultura ciudadana y homicidio en Bogotá. In: *Cultura Ciudadana en Bogotá: Nuevas perspectivas*. Bogotá D.C.: Secretaría de Cultura, Recreación y Deporte

Ministerio de la Protección Social de Colombia (2004) Estado del arte sobre comportamientos, conductas, normas culturales de la población asociados a comportamientos.. Link: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=926671

Mockus, Antanas (2002) Cultura ciudadana, programa contra la violencia en Santa Fe de Bogotá, Colombia, 1995-1997. Estudio Técnico. Washington: IDB. Link: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=353306

Mockus, Antanas (1999) Armonizar ley, moral y cultura. Paper presented at the International Conference Programas Municipales para la Prevención de la Violencia, Brazil, Dec. 1999.

Moncada, Eduardo (2009) Towards democratic policing in Colombia?: Institutional accountability through lateral reform. In: *Comparative Politics*, 41(4).

Montenegro, Santiago (2005) Convivencia y seguridad ciudadana: la construcción de una política pública: Dirección justicia y seguridad. Paper presented at: Foro Internacional Interamericano sobre Seguridad y Convivencia en Medellín, Colombia, 12/9-2005. Link: http://www.iadb.org/document.cfm?id=917319

Moreno, J and Sánchez, R (2009) Muertes por causas violentas y cido económico en Bogotá, Colombia: un estudio de series de tiempo, 1997-2006. In: *Revista Panamericana de Salud Publica*, 26(1), p. 23-30. Link: http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1020-49892009000700004&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=es

Moser, C and McIlwaine, C (2006) Latin American urban violence as a development concern: Towards a framework for violence reduction. In: *World Development*, 34(1), p. 89-112. Link: http://www.brookings.edu/views/artides/200601moser.pdf

Moser, C and Shrader, E. (1999) *A conceptual framework for violence reduction*. World Bank Working Paper 19815. Link: http://go.worldbank.org/331O7M8TT0

Muñoz, E; Gutiérrez, MI.; Arango, OA; and Guerrero, R (2004) *Creencias, Actitudes y Prácticas sobre Violencia en Bogotá, Cali y Medellín: Línea de Base*. Ministerio de la Protección Social; Universidad del Valle; Instituto Cisalva. Link: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=925182

NIH – The US National Institute of Health (2004) *Preventing Violence and Related Health-Risking Social Behavior.* Conference paper at NIH State-of the-Science Conference, Oct. 2004. Bethesda, US.

OECD (2011) *Preventing and Reducing Armed Violence in Urban Areas: Programming Note*, Conflict and Fragility, OECD Publishing. Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264107199-en

OECD (2011a) Investing in Security. A Global Assessment of Armed Violence Reduction Initiatives. OECD Publishing: Geneva. Link: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/0/48927716.pdf

Ortiz, MO; Ramírez, LP; and Barrera, D (2003) *Prevención temprana de la agresión: Orientaciones para el trabajo del docente en el aula*. Municipio de Medellín, Secretaría de Educación. Link: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=925246

Ospina, Juan Manuel (2005) Políticas públicas integrales para la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana en Bogotá D.C. Link: http://www.iadb.org/document.cfm?id=917315

Partners for Peacebuilding (2011) *Defining Human Security*. Policy Brief, June 2011. Washington: 3P Human Security Partners for Peacebuilding Policy.

Pécaut, D. (2008) *Las FARC. Una Guerrilla sin Fin o sin Fines?,* Bogotá, Colombia: Grupo Editoral Norma.

Pizarro, E. and Bejarano, A. M. (2003) 'Colombia - A Failing State?', *ReVista. Harvard Review Of Latin America,* spring**:** 1-5.

Puente, Carlos Arturo (2003) Elementos para la formulación del programa de apoyo a la seguridad y convivencia: Diagnósticos y teorías de intervención. Link: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=924252

Quesada, Charo (2004) *The people's police*. Washington: IDB. Link: http://www.iadb.org/idbamerica/index.cfm?thisid=2817

Ramos de Sánchez, Victoria (2003) *Evaluación de productos, efectos e impactos tempranos surgidos de la ejecución del programa de apoyo a la convivencia y ... Resultados preliminares de la evaluación.* Link: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=924340

Rozema, R (2008) Urban DDR-processes: paramilitaries and criminal networks in Medellín, Colombia. In: *Journal of Latin American Studies* (40), p. 423-452.

Sandoval Castaño, Edna (2003) Análisis de gestión : Evaluación de Productos, Efectos e Impactos Tempranos Surgidos de la Ejecución del Programa de Apoyo a la Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana. Link: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=924467

Santacruz, E; Echavarría, MH; Muñoz, MM; and Arias, SA (2006) Evaluación a educadores de salud en prevención de violencia, farmacodependencia y sexualidad insegura en jóvenes, Medellín, 2004. In: *Revista Facultad Nacional de Salud Pública*, 24(1), p. 70-78. Link: http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0120386X2006000100008&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=es

Scheye, E (2011) *Local Justice and Security Programming in selected neighborhoods in Colombia.* Hague: Clingendael.

Sherman, LW., Gottfredson, D., Mackenzie, D., Eck, J.; Reuter, P., and Bushway, S. (1997) *Preventing crime: What Works, what doesn't, what's promising: A report to the United States Congress.* Link: http://www.ncjrs.gov/works/

----------(1998) *Preventing crime: What Works, what doesn't, what's promising?* National Institute of Justice Reserch in Brief, NJC No. 171676. Link: http://ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/171676.pdf

Slaby, R; Roedell, W and Arezzo, D (2007) La prevención temprana de la violencia: Herramientas para los maestros de niños pequeños. (translation and adaptation form original manual in English by Guillermo Gutiérrez.). Link: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=926302

Solimano, Andres (ed.) (2002) Essays on conflict, peace, and development : Ensayos sobre paz y desarrollo - el caso de Colombia y la experiencia internacional. Washington, World Bank.Links: http://go.worldbank.org/6NL500F6G0 Spanish; http://go.worldbank.org/M2AZCQTVM0English

Solis, LG (2007) *Pandillas Juveniles y Gobernabilidad democrática en América Latina y el Caribe,* Memoria del Seminario, Madrid, 16-17 de abril 2007.

Suárez, G (2005) Espacios urbanos y prevención de la violencia: la experiencia de Bogotá. Bogotá. Link: http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd51/gsuarez1.pdf

Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou (2005) *Human Security : The Seven Challenges of Operationalizing the Concept*, "Human Security: 60 minutes to Convince", UNESCO, September 13, 2005-09- 14, Paris France

Thale, Geoff (2006) "Las pandillas juveniles centroamericanas y las respuestas de 'Mano Dura'". In: *Revista de pensamiento iberoamericano*, España, 2006.

World Bank (2011a) *Violence in the City. Understanding and Supporting Community Reponses to Urban Violence*. Washington: World Bank.

World Bank (2011b) *Crimen y Violencia en Centroamérica. Un Desafío para el Desarrollo*. Washington: World Bank, Departamentos de Desarrollo Sostenible y Reducción de la Pobreza y Gestión Económica Región de América Latina y el Caribe. Link: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/FINAL_VOLUME_I_SPANISH_CrimeAndViolence.pdf

World Bank (2011c) *Overview of The World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development*. Washington: World Bank. Link: http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/fulltext

World Bank (2003) *Guía didáctica para municipios: Prevención de la delincuencia y la violencia a nivel comunitario en las ciudades de América Latina.* Washington: World Bank.

World Bank (1999) *Violence in Colombia: building sustainable peace and social capital.* Washington: World Bank. Link: http://go.worldbank.org/HFJQQ8KZT0, http://go.worldbank.org/T9JE3NL0X0

Zuluaga, J. (2007) 'U.S. Security Policies and United States–Colombia Relations', *Latin American Perspectives,* 34(1)**:** 112-119.

Country reports and project documents

Cendex (2003a) Estudio de Impacto de las Unidad de Mediación y Conciliación desde la perspectiva de los actores de convivencia. Centro de proyectos para desarrollo, Bogotá.

Cendex (2003b) *Resultado Preliminares de la Evaluación.* Componente Fortalecimiento Ciudadano Categoría de Inversión: Jóvenes en riesgo y resocialización.

Cendex (2003c) *Resultado Finales de la Evaluación del los Talleres de la Unidad Coordinadora de prevención integral-UCPI.* Componente Fortalecimiento Ciudadano Categoría de Inversión: Prevención de alcohol y otras drogas.

Cendex (2003d) *Resultado Preliminares de la Evaluación del los Talleres de la Unidad Coordinadora de prevención integra-UCPI.* Componente Fortalecimiento Ciudadano Categoría de Inversión: Prevención de alcohol y otras drogas.
Cendex (2003e) *Resultado Final de la Evaluación del las Campanas*. Componente Fortalecimiento Ciudadano Categoría de inversión: Comunicación para la Convivencia. Bogotá.
Cendex (2003f) Análisis de Gestión. Componente de Transformación Institucional. Bogotá.
Cendex (2003g) Segundo Informe de Avances. Evaluación de Productos, efectos e impactos tempranos surgidos de la ejecución del programa 'Apoyo a la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana'.
Cendex (2003h) Tercer Informe de Avances. Elementos para la formulación del programa 'Apoyo a la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana': Diagnostico y teorías de intervención.

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), country pages, Colombia. Link http://www.iadb.org/en/countries/colombia/colombia-and-the-idb,1026.html
IDB Project CO-T1147 : Systematization & Dissemination of Medellin's Innovative Governance Approaches: Addressing Violence as a Means of Fighting Poverty and Social Exclusion. Link: http://www.iadb.org/en/projects/project,1303.html?id=CO-T1147
IDB Project CO-T1026 : Program of Inclusion, Violence Prevention and Youth Employment in Medellín. Link: http://www.iadb.org/en/projects/project,1303.html?id=CO-T1026
IDB Project CO0234 : Social Infrastructure and Management Community for Peace Link: http://www.iadb.org/en/projects/project,1303.html?id=CO0234

World Bank country pages, Colombia. Link: http://go.worldbank.org/DRFZ7P58Z0
WB CAS Completion Report Review of Country Partnership Strategy. Colombia. Link: http://go.worldbank.org/B509VMKAD0
WB Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for the period FY2012-2016, 2011/06/12. Link: http://go.worldbank.org/MLF8G8KAU0
WB Country partnership strategy, 2008/03/04. Link: http://go.worldbank.org/CZUP80SXR0
WB Project (project appraisal document), 2004/05/18: Colombia - Peace and Development Project. Link: http://go.worldbank.org/P4J5P5K2H0
WB Colombia - Peace and Development Project, 2003/11/14. Link: http://go.worldbank.org/847WF2KTV0
WB: Colombia - Country assistance strategy, 2002/12/24. Link: http://go.worldbank.org/WDBE92DXM0
WB: Colombia - Country Assistance Strategy Document, 1997/10/15. Link: http://go.worldbank.org/WPWI1EL3H0

UNDP Colombia website. Link: http://www.pnud.org.co/sitio.shtml

Rehabilitation and Research Centre for Torture Victims – RCT

is founded on the respect for human rights and the dignity and integrity of each individual. Therefore, it is RCT's proclaimed objective to help alleviate the human suffering resulting from torture - both for the individual, the family members and the community. RCT also aims at preventing torture. RCT seeks to achieve this aim by altering the mechanisms resulting in torture in each country. By preventing torture, we also ensure respect for human rights, social justice and a development towards a society without human suffering. www.rct.org